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Territoriality among Human Foragers: 
Ecological Models and an Application 
to Four Bushman Groups1
by Elizabeth Cashdan
D i s c u s s i o n s  o f  h u m a n  t e r r i t o r i a l i t y  have become more 
sophisticated in recent years; we see fewer arguments for or 
against the adaptiveness of territoriality for mankind in general 
and more attempts to probe the ecological factors that make 
territoriality adaptive in particular circumstances. Current 
theory from evolutionary ecology, particularly that dealing 
with the costs and benefits of territorial defense, appears to be 
particularly promising in explaining the variation that exists in 
hunter-gatherer territoriality. This body of theory, which holds 
that territoriality should be found only where its benefits 
exceed its costs, has led to the general expectation that dense 
and predictable resources, being less costly to defend, will be 
associated with a greater degree of territoriality. These argu­
ments have been explicitly applied to human territoriality by 
Dyson-Hudson and Smith (1978) and are implicit in other 
recent discussions (e.g., Bishop 1970, Acheson 1975).
Among the Bushmen of the Kalahari, however, the patterning 
is the opposite of what these arguments might lead us to expect;
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the most territorial Bushman groups are found where resources 
are sparsest and least predictable. In explaining these findings, 
I argue that the cognitive and cultural capacities of our species 
alter the ways in which territories can be defended, which in 
turn may affect the expected relationships between environ­
mental variables and territoriality. In this paper, then, I wish 
not only to extend the animal models of territoriality to human 
foragers, but also to consider how aspects of behavior unique 
to humans affect territorial costs and benefits and hence how 
the animal models might be modified to develop a general 
theory of human territoriality.
I will begin with a selective review of the ecological theory of 
territoriality, focusing on cost-benefit approaches. Following 
this, I will discuss territoriality among human foragers in 
general and consider some of the ways in which human memory 
and culture affect the mechanisms, and hence the costs, of 
territorial exclusion and defense. In the biological models of 
territoriality, resource abundance and predictability affect 
territorial costs primarily through their effects on territory size. 
I will argue that, for human foragers, territory size above a 
given threshold will be associated with a qualitatively different 
type of territorial defense and that above this threshold terri­
tory size is relatively unimportant in determining defense costs. 
Finally, I will look in detail at territoriality among four Bush­
man groups in light of these arguments. The four groups, IKung, 
Nharo, G/wi, and !Ko, are in environments that differ in both 
density and predictability of resources. I will attempt to relate 
these environmental differences to differences in the degree and 
nature of territoriality that the groups exhibit.
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BACKGROUND: THE ECOLOGICAL THEORY
There is no consensus in the literature of animal ecology con­
cerning the definition of territory. Some definitions are fairly 
narrow, emphasizing both exclusive occupancy by the territory 
holder and a means of defense by which the territory is main­
tained (e.g., Wilson 1975, Brown 1975), while others are quite 
broad, recognizing territoriality solely on the basis of “spacing 
out” or dispersion (e.g., Davies 1978). Following Carpenter and 
MacMillan (1976:639) I recognize territoriality as “the mainte­
nance of an area ‘within which the resident controls or restricts 
use of one or more environmental resources.’ ” With this 
definition, which I feel is particularly well suited to human
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foragers, territoriality can be viewed as a type of resource 
management that depends on controlling and limiting access to 
resources. Exclusive use of a territory may follow from it but 
is not a necessary part of it.
Most recent studies of territoriality in ecology have assumed 
that territoriality confers an advantage in fitness upon the 
territory holder and have attempted to determine the selective 
contexts that favor it. This approach began with Brown (1964), 
who argued that, while competition for limited resources is a 
prerequisite, territoriality will be found only where these 
resources are also “economically defendable,” i.e., where the 
benefits to fitness gained from territoriality exceed the costs. 
The benefits derive principally from the increased availability 
of resources, while the costs include the time, energy, and 
risks involved in territorial defense. Another possible benefit of 
territoriality, although one that has not been included in cost- 
benefit models thus far, is increased foraging efficiency. Since 
it should be easier for an individual to monitor resources when 
use by others is limited or controlled, territoriality may increase 
foraging efficiency by improving information concerning the 
abundance and location of resources within the territory.
Both costs and benefits (hence economic defensibility) can be 
expected to vary with territory size. As the area that must be 
patrolled increases, so do the costs of territorial defense. Bene­
fits, such as increased resources, also increase with territory 
size, although the benefits may level off as the territory contains 
more of the resource than the animal needs. It should be 
possible, therefore, to find an optimum territory size at which 
the net benefit is greatest (Davies 1978, but see Ebersole 1980).
Although there have been some attempts to measure the 
costs and benefits of territoriality in terms of calories expended 
and gained (e.g., Gill and Wolf 1975, Carpenter and MacMillan 
1976), most studies have taken the easier but less direct ap­
proach of seeing how territorial behavior changes with ecological 
conditions. One environmental variable that has clear effects 
on territorial costs and benefits is the density of resources. As 
resources become sparser, the animal must have a larger terri­
tory to satisfy its needs, and therefore defense costs increase 
and may come to outweigh the benefits conferred by terri­
toriality. At the other extreme, resources may be so abundant 
in relation to the animal's needs that competition is at a mini­
mum and there is nothing to be gained from defending a 
territory. We may therefore expect to find territoriality between 
these two thresholds of resource abundance.
There is empirical support for the effects of resource density 
on territoriality. Many studies have shown an inverse relation­
ship between territory size and resource density (Cody and 
Cody 1972, Simon 1975, Gill and Wolf 1975, Kodric-Brown and 
Brown 1978), and the same pattern appears to hold for at least 
some human foragers (e.g., Rogers [1969:45] for the Cree- 
Ojibwa Indians of eastern subarctic Canada and Peterson 
[1972:24] for sizes of clan estates in Australia). Studies have 
also been done on nectar-feeding birds that show an upper and 
a lower threshold for economic defensibility and territoriality 
at two levels of flower abundance (Carpenter and MacMillan 
1976) and at levels of flower abundance that depend also on 
territory size (Kodric-Brown and Brown 1978).
In the theory just summarized, no benefits accrue from 
territoriality without competition for resources, and competi­
tion is expected to increase as resources become scarcer. Clearly, 
however, competition results not simply from scarcity of 
resources in any absolute sense, but from scarcity relative to 
population density. This should be kept in mind, although 
population density has not been explicitly considered in the 
ecological literature on territoriality, and I will not do so here.
Predictability is another important environmental variable 
that has been associated with territoriality, since resources that 
are unpredictable, transient, or highly mobile should be less 
economical to defend (Brown 1964). There is also considerable 
evidence to support this relationship. Among primates, for
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example, “the fruit-eating arboreal species, which exploit a 
temporally and spatially unpredictable food supply in an 
environment with poor visibility, are non-territorial, whereas 
the leaf and bud-eating monkeys, which exploit more abundant 
and predictable food supplies, are strongly territorial” (Brown 
and Orians 1970:252). Individuals may also respond flexibly to 
changes in resources; for example, Davies (1976) has shown 
that pied wagtails change foraging strategies as the distribution 
of resources changes, defending individual territories when 
food is dense and predictable and foraging in flocks when food 
supplies are patchy and transient. Similar patterns have been 
described for spotted hyenas (Kruuk 1972) and other animals 
(see Davies 1978).
Many studies have cited or documented in a qualitative 
manner the relation of resource predictability to territoriality, 
but none of these, to my knowledge, has actually measured 
predictability or even suggested a means of doing so. Measures 
have been proposed elsewhere in the ecological literature, 
however. Roughgarden (1979: chap. 20) identifies the pre­
dictability of a sequence of events with the autocorrelation 
function of the variable being predicted, i.e., the correlation 
coefficient between observations in a sequence as a function of 
the interval between them. It is not clear, however, that the 
notion of predictability embodied in the ecological arguments 
concerning territoriality is the same as that implied by Rough- 
garden’s measure. Predictability, as the term is used in the 
literature concerning territoriality, seems to refer to the confi­
dence that can be placed in predictions of the abundance of 
resources at some time or times in the future. It is worthwhile 
to defend a territory only if there is some basis for confidence 
that resources will still be present when they are wanted. Thus, 
any reasonable measure of predictability should be inversely 
related to the magnitude of the average difference between 
actual and predicted values. One such measure is the inverse 
of the residual variance of actual values about predicted values. 
Clearly, any such measure will depend on the way in which 
predictions are made as well as on the statistical properties of 
the environment. Thus, predictability is an attribute not merely 
of the environment, but also of the pattern of response to 
environmental variation.
Although patchiness of resources has received little attention 
in this literature, there is reason to believe that it may en­
courage territorial behavior. Since patchy resources are aggre­
gated, they are easy to defend; and, since territories will be of 
uneven quality in a coarse-grained patchy environment, 
competition for prime territories will be keen. (The limiting 
case here would be the situation in which inhabitants of one 
territory hold a monopoly on a resource that occurs only in 
that territory.) Patchiness, therefore, should reduce the costs 
and increase the benefits associated with territorial defense.
In their application of the cost-benefit theory to human 
populations, Dyson-Hudson and Smith (1978) argue that 
territoriality is most likely when resources are abundant and 
predictable. Citing the territorial behavior of the Basin- 
Plateau Indians, the northern Ojibwa, and the Karimojong, 
they show that the populations in question are territorial only 
when resources are dense and predictable, hence economically 
defensible.
TERRITORIALITY AMONG HUMAN FORAGERS
How useful is the ecological theory just discussed in explaining 
territoriality among human foragers? In applying the theory, 
it is important to remember that the costs and benefits of 
territoriality depend not only on the nature of the environment, 
but also on the characteristics of the species concerned. In the 
case of humans, we can expect that our long-term memory, 
sophisticated means of information exchange, and culture will 
affect the mechanisms—and hence the costs—of territorial
C U R R E N T  A N T H R O P O L O G Y
defense. I will argue that human foragers have available two 
very different mechanisms for controlling access to territorial 
resources: (a) overt competition through “perimeter defense” 
of territorial space and (b) reciprocal altruism through con­
trolled access to the social group. The groups studied by Dyson- 
Hudson and Smith (1978) employ the former strategy, and for 
these groups the theory can be applied fairly directly. The 
Bushmen, however, like many other foragers, employ the latter 
strategy, and for these foragers the expected relationships 
between resource density and predictability and territoriality 
no longer apply.
Territory size is an important intermediate variable linking 
environmental characteristics to the economic defensibility of 
a territory. When resources are scarce, animals need a larger 
territory to obtain the same quantity of resources. Territory 
size will also be influenced by spatial structure in the distribu­
tion of resources. Harpending and Davis (1977) argue that 
range or territory size needs to be large where there is a great 
deal of variation from place to place in the availability of 
resources and where the various resources needed tend not to 
co-occur. When, in addition, locations of resource abundance 
are unpredictable from year to year, it seems likely that optimal 
territory size will be additionally increased.
Defense costs for nonhuman animals, which consist chiefly 
of display or advertisement of the territory, time and energy 
spent monitoring the territory for intruders, and the cost of 
repelling intruders, are assumed to increase with territory size, 
as the animal must patrol a larger area. Humans monitor and 
defend territories in ways not found in other species, however, 
and the costs of these human means of territorial defense may 
be quite unrelated to the size of the territory. To the extent 
that this is true, the relationship of resource density and pre­
dictability to territoriality will no longer hold.
The two types of territoriality just mentioned are associated 
with different means of excluding outsiders from territorial 
resources. In the case of overt competition, foragers typically 
mark the perimeter of their territory boundary and control 
access to the territory space itself (“perimeter defense”). With 
reciprocal altruism, they control access not to the territory 
space itself, but to the social group having rights to the territory 
(“social boundary defense”).
Among foragers using the former strategy I would include 
the Vedda, Owens Valley Paiute, Guayaki, many native 
California groups such as the Maidu and Cahuilla, and possibly 
also the Ainu. Foragers of this group “look” territorial because 
their means of controlling access to resources is similar to 
that found in nonhuman species. Territory boundaries are 
advertised and marked, social units correspond to territory 
units, and there is usually little movement of individuals 
across territory boundaries. These foragers have small terri­
tories (on the order of 300 mi.2 or less), and most are favored 
with dense and reliable resources, as the small territory sizes 
would suggest.
The Vedda are a case in point. According to Seligmann and 
Seligmann (1911:106-17), each Vedda band occupied and 
defended a territory, and this territory was subdivided for 
individual band members, who could pass their property on to 
their children or give it to sons-in-law at their daughter’s 
marriage. Territory boundaries not clearly defined by natural 
features were marked by pictures, cut into tree trunks, of a 
man with a drawn bow. Trespass was strongly resented, and 
intruders might be shot, although the borders were so well 
known that quarrels over trespass were rare. Territories were 
so jealously guarded that a visitor passing through the area 
reported that he was stopped by an archer, interrogated, and 
made to wait at a band’s territory boundary until word arrived 
from an “elder,” whereupon he was escorted through the
territory to the boundary on the other side. Here he was again 
made to wait for permission to pass and then handed over to a 
member of the neighboring district to be similarly escorted 
through that band’s territory. As would be expected, Vedda 
territories were small, about a two- or three-hour walk from 
one boundary to another.
Because territoriality among these groups is not unlike that 
found in other species, the ecological arguments developed for 
these other species should also be applicable. Even among 
these groups, of course, we can expect some differences in the 
means, and hence the costs, of territorial defense. For example, 
human memory and communication should lessen the frequency 
with which intruders need be repulsed, since each individual 
need not learn for himself the consequences of territorial 
trespass. This and other factors may lessen defense costs over­
all but should not affect the relationship between such costs 
and territory size. Because residents are controlling entry into 
the territorial space itself, we should still expect to find that 
defense costs, especially the costs of monitoring the territory 
for intruders, increase with territory size. The arguments 
relating environmental variables to economic defensibility, 
therefore, should still be applicable.
The dense and predictable resources that give rise to perime­
ter defense also make an area desirable for nonforaging peoples. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that many of the areas charac­
terized by perimeter defense among hunter-gatherers are also 
areas that were subject to early encroachment by nonforaging 
peoples. Any association of perimeter defense with “accul- 
turated” foragers, therefore, is probably due to the fact that 
both are effects of the same environmental variables; there is 
no reason to assume that perimeter defense itself is a result of 
such contact. (The effects of contact on hunter-gatherer 
territoriality are no doubt complex and will not be considered 
here.)
S o c ia l  B o u n d a r y  D e f e n s e
As resources become sparse or unpredictable and ranges become 
larger, making perimeter defense uneconomical, humans have 
another option available. Rather than give up territorial 
defense entirely, they can control access to resources by con­
trolling access to the social group inhabiting the area (social 
boundary defense). This type of territoriality has been described 
by Peterson (1975:60), who argues that because of the large 
size of Australian territories (clan estates), which range from 
a low of about 400 mi.2 in the rich woodlands of Arnhem Land 
to four times that size in the desert areas (Peterson 1972), 
defense of local group boundaries would be “not only un­
rewarding but impossible in face of the need to collect food. An 
alternative strategy for defending the land is to make accep­
tance into the local land using group a preliminary requirement 
for using the resources in its territory; that is, by defending the 
boundaries of the social group rather than the perimeter of 
the territory itself.”
In Australia, rites of entry into social groups take the form 
of elaborate greeting ceremonies. According to Peterson (1975: 
62), the failure to engage in these greeting ceremonies “is 
taken as a prelude to an act of hostility and provokes the 
likelihood of aggression from the territory occupiers. Once a 
person or party has been through a rite of entry, however, they 
have equal access with the hosts to the everyday resources of 
the territory. Greeting ceremonies are thus functionally analo­
gous to boundary defense, in that they prevent unregulated 
movement between territories and control access to food 
resources.”
Among foragers with this type of territoriality, I would 
include, in addition to the Australians, the Bushmen, at least 
some Eskimo groups, and possibly the Athabascans and
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Algonkians of the boreal forest. Among these foragers, social 
groups are associated with particular areas, but territory 
boundaries are not marked and are recognized only by natural 
features of the environment. Because reciprocal access involves 
the movement of individuals across territory boundaries and 
between social groups, furthermore, social units do not clearly 
correspond to territorial units, particularly over the short term. 
This latter feature, a response to the unpredictable environ­
ments in which these foragers are found, tends to make these 
groups “look” nonterritorial, if one is accustomed to animal 
models of territoriality. The impression is enhanced by the lack 
of clearly marked and advertised territory boundaries.
In what sense, then, can this strategy be viewed as terri­
toriality? I have defined a territory as “an area within which 
the resident controls or restricts use of one or more environ­
mental resources.” In these foraging groups there are social 
means of gaining access rights to resources in an area (e.g., 
through inheritance, fictive kin ties, trading partnerships), and 
the lack of these rights can be, and often is, used as a means of 
excluding nonmembers. This process clearly provides a means 
of controlling and limiting access to resources and is therefore 
a form of territoriality.
In considering the costs of this type of territorial defense, we 
must include the time and energy spent in such things as 
greeting rituals, the costs (ranging from outright aggression to 
more subtle means of exclusion) of repelling strangers, and, 
most importantly, the energy devoted to social and political 
relationships that enable individuals to claim and manipulate 
social membership and rights of access. For our purposes, the 
important thing about these costs is that they are quite un­
related to the size of the territory. For groups that defend 
territorial resources through social boundary defense, then, we 
should not expect defense costs to increase with territory size; 
nor, therefore, should such costs increase as resources become 
increasingly sparse and unpredictable.
The admittance of outsiders to the social group typically 
involves the expectation that access will be reciprocated when 
circumstances permit, and it may therefore be viewed as an 
example of reciprocal altruism. The conditions under which 
such reciprocity will be mutually advantageous have been 
analyzed by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981:1393) using a form 
of the “prisoner’s dilemma” game; they found that it is “evolu- 
tionarily stable if and only if the interactions between individuals 
have a sufficiently large probability of continuing.” Because 
foragers normally restrict interterritorial visits to kin and 
others with whom they have already established close ties, 
this condition should be easily met in most cases. Much effort, 
in fact, may be spent in strengthening these ties to ensure that 
the hospitality is indeed reciprocated (see Wiessner 1977). The 
conditions that favor reciprocal altruism also depend on the 
“payoff matrix,” which in the case of territoriality will depend 
in part on the environment. We can expect that the advantages 
of reciprocal territorial access will be higher in coarse-grained 
patchy environments or environments in which resource 
abundance varies unpredictably in space and time.
This type of territoriality describes many foragers quite 
well, but it is worth considering how it can work. If one is 
“defending the boundaries of the social group rather than the 
perimeter of the territory itself,” as Peterson puts it, why 
should potential intruders ask to be included in the social 
group in the first place? Why trouble to cultivate rights of 
access if one can take resources without asking? Is this simply 
territoriality by the honor system?
One reason is the importance of information exchange in 
these environments. Where territories are large and resources 
unpredictable, outsiders can minimize their foraging costs con­
siderably if they obtain information from the residents con­
cerning the location of resources. They therefore have an 
incentive to seek access to the social group, since it is through 
the social interactions of these rituals that information ex­
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change takes place. To the extent that this is true, furthermore, 
we can expect that the costs of not cooperating in asking per­
mission will rise with territory size, since the more unpredict­
able the resources and the larger the territory, the more 
difficult it will be for outsiders to exploit the area unaided.
The granting of permission, furthermore, often involves the 
allocation of particular foraging areas to be used by the visitors. 
This ensures that both residents and visitors make optimum 
use of the area’s resources. For example, foraging efficiency 
should be enhanced for both if the visitors restrict their foraging 
to a small area with the assurance that they will not be com­
peting with the residents for these resources.
The use of territoriality as a means of information exchange 
and resource allocation appears to be widespread among human 
foragers in areas of sparse and unpredictable resources. For 
example, a //G ana resident of the Central Kalahari told me 
that, while permission to use the resources of another area is 
never refused, the owners may tell the newcomers “which side 
to use and which side not to use.” Tanner (1973:112) reports a 
similar finding for the Mistassini Cree: “the definition of a 
territory boundary is not as often used in keeping outsiders 
off one’s land, as it is in making sure in advance that the 
hunting and trapping activities of the group do not overlap 
with those of another. A hunting territory is a unit of manage­
ment.” Similarly, among the Eskimo of northwestern Alaska, 
“the summer movements of the members of different societies 
into and out of one another’s territories were so precisely 
articulated that almost no conflict resulted from them.” If 
such moves were not undertaken after a territory had been 
vacated by its owners or under the truce conditions that 
existed at certain times of the year, they would lead to blood­
shed (Burch 1980:276).
Allocating resources in this fashion can be viewed as terri­
torial behavior even where it does not involve the expulsion of 
outsiders from the territory as a whole. It differs from such 
expulsion, however, in that it may be beneficial to both the 
territory holder and the “intruder.” It can therefore be advan­
tageous for both to play by the rules in seeking access to the 
social group.
Another reason for the feasibility of territoriality by social 
boundary defense lies in the effects of territory size on the costs 
of detecting intruders. Although we can ordinarily expect that 
the costs of monitoring a territory for intruders will increase 
with territory size, there is a counterforce operating. With the 
large territories that one finds with this type of territoriality 
(often over 1,000 mi.2), the transport costs of trespass into 
another territory will be so high that it will be economical only 
if the intruders remain in the territory for some time. The 
longer they remain, however, the greater will be the chances 
of detection. This may make trespassing an unproductive 
strategy even if the residents are not engaging in systematic 
perimeter defense.
The type of resource will be an important variable in deter­
mining these transport costs and the chances of detection. Even 
with large territories, for example, it may pay to go into another 
territory for a day or two for a resource that is valuable and 
compact (perhaps salt or game), and such an intrusion may 
well go undetected. The critical resource in the Central Kala­
hari, on the other hand, is water or, where it is absent, vegetable 
foods (melons, roots) that provide a source of moisture. For 
resources such as these, it would clearly be impractical to trek 
many miles into another territory unless one could remain in 
the area to use them. Such a long-term intrusion would almost 
certainly become known to the residents, simply in the course 
of their normal foraging and visiting activity. In a small 
territory, conversely, where it takes only a few hours to walk 
from one border to another, the costs of a trip into a neighboring 
area for such a resource would be no more than that of a 
typical Kalahari gathering trip, and such an intrusion would 
easily be economical if borders were not patrolled.
C U R R E N T  A N T H R O P O L O G Y
Defending the boundaries of the social group is a territorial 
defense strategy that works only if potential intruders play 
the game and seek access to the group, rather than attempt to 
cross into the territory undetected. To summarize, the condi­
tions under which the benefits of such cooperation exceed the 
benefits of trespassing unannounced include (a) the likelihood 
that interactions between visitors and residents will continue 
(see Axelrod and Hamilton 1981), (b) the value of information 
exchange to potential intruders, (c) the probability that tres­
passers will be detected, and (d) the value of reciprocal access 
itself. The latter three factors are determined in part by 
territory size and the characteristics of the environment. 
Reciprocal access is advantageous only in patchy environments 
or environments in which areas of relative abundance vary 
from year to year. The value of seeking information about 
these resources should also be greatest in large territories with 
unpredictable resources, since such environments will be more 
difficult to exploit unaided. And, finally, the chance that tres­
passers will be accidentally discovered may be high when terri­
tories are so large that intruders must remain in the territory 
an appreciable length of time to exploit the resource. Each of 
these conditions makes it more advantageous for a potential 
intruder to seek social rights of access than to trespass un­
announced.
A COMPARISON OF FOUR BUSHMAN GROUPS
Southern African Bushmen provide a good “test case” for the 
ecological arguments concerning territoriality, because Bush­
man groups can be found in a wide range of environments, and 
ethnographic sources indicate appreciable differences in terri­
toriality among them. The mechanisms of exclusion are the 
same among the different groups (all control access to resources 
through social boundary defense), but the degree to which 
these mechanisms are put into practice differs considerably. 
This can be seen both in the attitudes and behavior toward 
outsiders and in the extent of the network of reciprocal access 
rights. An examination of the territorial behavior of four Bush­
man groups (Nharo, !Kung, G/wi, and !Ko) in relation to the 
abundance and predictability of resources in the regions they 
inhabit shows that the most territorial groups (those that are 
the least tolerant of outsiders) are found where resources are 
both sparse and highly variable. Although this is contrary to 
what one might expect from the traditional ecological argu­
ments, it is consistent with the general theory of costs and 
benefits when the factors discussed in the preceding section 
are taken into account.
Because the four Bushman groups were studied by different 
researchers and few comparable hard data are available, the 
existing literature will not permit a really reliable test of the 
ecological arguments. The difficulty is compounded by the 
fact that, in some cases, the picture presented by earlier 
researchers differs markedly from that given by more recent 
ones (e.g., compare Fourie 1928 with Yellen 1976). In order to 
obviate this problem somewhat, I am limiting myself to ethno­
graphic reports based on fieldwork undertaken no earlier than 
the 1950s. In my view, the differences reported by modern 
researchers are marked enough to give some confidence that the 
ethnographers are reporting real differences, rather than 
differing interpretations of the same reality, but the ambiguities 
inherent in comparing the work of different researchers should 
be kept in mind.
E n v i r o n m e n t
The abundance, predictability, and distribution of food re­
sources are determined to a significant extent by rainfall, 
particularly in a desert region such as the Kalahari where 
water is a limiting resource. In comparing the environments of
the four Bushman groups, therefore, it will be helpful to begin 
by considering rainfall as a proxy variable for food resources. 
In arid climates, primary production (the rate at which plants 
assimilate solar energy) is very strongly correlated with pre­
cipitation; a plot of annual rainfall by primary production in 
the Namibian desert shows an almost perfect linear relationship 
(Pianka 1978:13-14). Productivity primarily determines the 
growth of vegetation and secondarily influences the abundance 
of animals and should, therefore, be a good measure of human 
food resources.
Approximate values for mean annual rainfall for the four 
Bushman groups can be determined from Pike’s (1971) iso- 
hyetal map of Botswana. Because some of the groups have a 
fairly wide distribution, it is worth considering not only the 
range in mean annual rainfall for the group as a whole, but 
also the rainfall for the particular locations in which the 
ethnographers did their research. Figure 1 gives rainfall data 
for four locations that represent, as nearly as I can determine, 
the areas in which the researchers in question centered their 
field studies. Figure 2 shows where these places are. Dobe (the 
!Kung location) and Ghanzi (the Nharo location) get the most 
rainfall, both having about 400 mm yearly. p^Kade (the G/wi 
location) is somewhat drier, getting about 345 mm per year, 
and Lone Tree (the !Ko location) gets the least rain, about 
325 mm per year. In general, the rainfall for each region as a 
whole parallels this pattern, although the range for the Nharo 
region is considerable, rainfall in its drier southwestern part 
being the same as for the G/wi and the !Ko.
Just as mean annual rainfall provides a good estimate of 
average productivity in desert regions, so variation and un­
predictability in rainfall should cause variation and unpre­
dictability in productivity and food availability. The literature 
on territoriality refers chiefly to predictability, but it is intu­
itively reasonable that the variance is itself important in deter­
mining the economic defensibility of a territory. For example, 
if resources vary only slightly, it should make little difference 
to the territory holder, no matter how unpredictable this 
slight variation may be. It was suggested earlier that pre­
dictability might be usefully measured by the inverse of the
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F ig . 1. Magnitude and variation of rainfall at four Kalahari locations. 
Rectangles indicate rainfall patterns for the group as a whole; dots 
indicate ethnographic study sites within these areas. The data, from 
Pike (1971), are based on a 30-year adjusted seasonal mean and may 
differ from those of the Botswana Weather Bureau (p. 73).
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F ig . 2. Approximate locations and study sites for four Bushman 
groups.
residual variance of actual values about predicted values. If 
there is no temporal autocorrelation in a resource (i.e., if it is 
completely unpredictable according to Roughgarden’s defini­
tion), then the best estimate of the amount of the resource at 
some point in the future would be the long-term mean. In this 
limiting case, the measure of predictability suggested here 
would be equivalent to the inverse of the total variance.
I have no data on the autocorrelation of rainfall or other 
resources for the Bushman groups discussed here, but patterns 
of rainfall in the Kalahari appear highly unpredictable in 
spatial as well as temporal dimensions. More to the point, I am 
unaware of any ability of the Bushmen to predict this year’s 
rainfall on the basis of rainfall in past years. If this is true, 
then we can use the inverse of the variance in mean annual 
rainfall as a measure of their ability to predict rainfall in future 
years.
Fluctuations in annual rainfall are marked in arid regions 
generally and in the Kalahari in particular and are most severe 
in areas with the lowest average rainfall. We can compare the 
variation in rainfall for the four Bushman groups by referring 
to Pike’s (1971) map of percentage variability (coefficient of 
variation) in mean annual rainfall across Botswana. These 
data, summarized in figure 1, show that the IKung are in the 
least variable environment, the coefficient of variation in mean 
annual rainfall being only 25-30%. Rainfall in the Nharo 
region is more variable, about 30-40%, while that in the G/wi 
region is about 45-65%. The !Ko, in the most arid region, also 
have the greatest percentage variability, about 50-70%. The 
central research locations within each region show the same 
pattern, Dobe being the least variable, followed in order by 
Ghanzi, ?^Kade, and Lone Tree.2
While rainfall patterns are the only quantitative data 
available for comparing the abundance and variability of food 
resources in the four regions, ethnographic descriptions do 
corroborate the findings based on rainfall.
The !Ko, who have both the lowest and the most variable 
mean annual rainfall of the four groups, live in an area that 
Barnard (1979:137) describes as “poorer than that of the other 
major Bushman peoples. There is no staple food plant, and the
2 Standard deviations vary similarly, although, as would be ex­
pected, the pattern is less marked than that shown by the coefficient 
of variation. It is not obvious which is the most appropriate measure; 
foragers have to adjust to changes in actual rainfall, which would 
suggest that the standard deviation would be more appropriate, but 
because a deficit of a given amount would be more severe in groups 
that are in more severely arid areas the percentage variability may 
be of more relevance.
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availability of edible plants and animals, and of water, fluc­
tuates considerably.” Heinz (1972:414-15), the chief ethnog­
rapher of the !Ko, notes that “the territory of the IKung has a 
longer rainy season and more game than the land of the !Ko.” 
He notes that the IKung area also has a greater abundance of 
wild plant foods and adds, “I have seen for myself that the 
IKung which live in the area of Lee’s studies are indeed fortu­
nate with regard to their food resources.”
The G/wi, who have slightly more abundant and less variable 
rainfall than the IKo, have also been compared with the more 
well-favored IKung. Tanaka (1976:99) says, “ p^Kade pan . . . 
is located in a much drier zone [than Dobe]; plant foods are 
not nearly as abundant or of as high quality as they are in the 
Dobe area, and standing water is extremely scarce.” Evidence 
for the greater abundance of food resources in the IKung area 
is supported by the fact that the G/wi spend more time on 
foraging activities than do the IKung, working 32.5 hours per 
week (Tanaka 1980:76-77) as compared with only 17.1 hours 
per week for the IKung (Lee 1979: chap. 9; 1968).
The rainfall characteristics of the Nharo area, especially 
around Ghanzi, suggest that food resources should be better 
than those of the IKo and G/wi but not as good as those of the 
IKung. Barnard (1979:38) describes the Nharo area as being 
well favored with food and water resources but nonetheless 
states that “Zhu/twasi [IKung] country has a greater abun­
dance of resources than any other part of the Kalahari.”
The relative abundance of water resources is not identical to 
that of food resources and must be considered separately. Like 
food resources, water resources are determined to an important 
extent by rainfall. Equally important, however, is the presence 
or absence of surface rock that can hold water in permanent 
pools. The Nharo, who live along a limestone ridge, have 
always had permanent pans and plentiful water in their region 
and today have even more abundant water available through 
the boreholes that have been drilled on the nearby Ghanzi 
ranches (Barnard 1979). The IKung are also relatively well 
supplied with water, although less so than the Nharo; many 
of the pans in the IKung region provide only seasonal water, 
but at least a few hold water year-round, even in a drought 
year (Lee 1972a, 1979). The Bantu wells that have been dug at 
many of these locations have presumably increased the amount 
and reliability of water for the IKung in recent years, although 
probably not to the same degree as the mechanized boreholes 
have for the Nharo.
In contrast to these two groups, neither the G/wi nor the IKo 
has traditionally had a permanent source of standing water. 
Because the pools in these areas do not hold water for more 
than a few weeks after a rain, both groups must rely for moisture 
on tsama melons and other succulent plants during part of the 
year (Silberbauer 1972, 1981; Tanaka 1976, 1980; Heinz and 
Maguire n.d.). Things have eased somewhat for the G/wi and 
IKo in recent years, however, because of the drilling of govern­
ment boreholes; there is one borehole in the G/wi area that was 
established recently (after Silberbauer’s fieldwork), and there 
are now others in the IKo area as well.
This summary of water resources supports Barnard’s (1979) 
conclusion that the Nharo have the most abundant water 
supply of the four groups, followed in order by the IKung, 
G/wi, and IKo. This ranking for water resources is similar to 
the ranking for rainfall (hence food resources), the chief differ­
ence being that the Nharo have abundant standing water in 
spite of having less abundant wild food resources than the 
IKung.
T e r r i t o r i a l i t y
All four Bushman groups control access through social boundary 
defense rather than perimeter defense. The following brief 
summary of the common features of their territorial organiza­
tion and acquisition and use of land rights is drawn from
c u r r e n t  a n t h r o p o l o g y
Heinz (1972) for the !Ko, Barnard (1979) for the Nharo, 
Silberbauer (1972, 1981) for the G/wi (Tanaka, the other 
principal G/wi ethnographer, wrote little about territorial 
organization), and Lee (1972, 1979), Wiessner (1977), Marshall 
(1976), and Yellen (1976) for the IKung. I have also made use 
of my own familiarity with the territorial organization of the 
//G ana of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (Cashdan 1977, 
1980) although I have not included this group in the formal 
comparisons.
Bushmen inherit primary access rights to the resources of a 
territory through their parents; territorial inheritance is bi­
lateral, the primary affiliation being with the territory in which 
the individual decides to live. Less commonly, access rights to 
a territory are acquired through occupation of an empty 
territory. Territorial boundaries are not marked, but are 
recognized by natural landmarks such as pans or groves of 
trees, and gathering across a border is usually avoided.
There is considerable movement across territory boundaries 
and between social groups, so that bands will typically include 
members having access rights to more than one territory. While 
much of this movement is purely social, some is a response to 
the spatial variation of resources in the Kalahari. When re­
sources are scarce in one area, people from that area will 
customarily move in with relatives living in a temporarily 
more well-favored location.
Permission to use the resources of another area is always 
asked but rarely if ever refused. Even among the less territorial 
IKung, however, an individual may be met with hostility if he 
moves into a territory without having sought permission and 
without access rights or kin ties to residents of the territory 
(see Marshall 1976:132). Permission is asked of the territory 
“owners,” who are typically elder members of long standing 
and may be founding members of the band or individuals 
descended from the founders. The status of “owner” does not 
confer real ownership of resources, however; decisions con­
cerning visitors and the allocation of resources are made by 
consensus, and the owner acts as spokesperson for the band.
The process by which individuals gain access rights to the 
resources of other territories is described by Silberbauer (1981 : 
141) as follows:
As advance news of movements in the territories of neighboring and 
allied bands is usually available, new arrivals are seldom a surprise 
and band consensus has already crystallized during informal discus­
sion of the prospect of the newcomer’s arrival. The “owner” then 
merely voices his approval on behalf of his fellows. . . . Although 
membership is not closed, it does confer exclusive rights. Permission 
is never actually withheld and its asking is simply a formality. It is, 
however, a formality that clearly indicates that the use of territorial 
resources and residence have to be granted before they are gained. 
Unwelcome visitors are given permission to remain but are later 
eased out of the band.
This passage illustrates clearly that defense of territorial 
resources is effected by controlling access to the social group. 
There are no formal greeting rituals such as are found in 
Australia, but the essence of the process is the same. Silberbauer 
also makes it clear that the process can be effective in excluding 
outsiders, even without hostility or physical defense of territory 
boundaries.
The many similarities in the form of territorial organization 
among the four Bushman groups suggest that similar mecha­
nisms exist among them for excluding outsiders and controlling 
access to territorial resources. The degree to which such ex­
clusionary mechanisms are brought into play, however, appears 
to differ.
Among the IKo, territoriality operates not only at the level of 
the band, but at the level of the band “nexus,” a group of 
bands related to each other by ties of friendship, kinship, and 
ritual bonds. According to Heinz (1972:407-8), there is con­
siderable intermarriage between bands within a nexus, and 
permission to forage in the territory of another band within
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the nexus, while it must be sought, is normally granted. Rela­
tionships between bands within a nexus, therefore, are very 
much like interband relationships as they have been described 
for the IKung. Among the IKo, however, the band nexus (a 
level of organization not described for the IKung) is “a true 
territorial group.” There is a strip of “no-man’s-land” between 
the land of adjacent nexuses in which foraging is avoided, and 
“members of a band would never hunt on the land of an adjoin­
ing nexus” because the absence of kinship ties between them 
deprives them of such access (Heinz 1972:408). Band nexus 
boundaries are often dialect boundaries (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1974a: 
6; Barnard 1979:138), and relationships between different 
nexuses may be characterized by great animosity.
Barnard (1979:137) has concluded that “the IKo are highly 
territorial, and have a well-known dislike of strangers,” and 
this is amply documented by Heinz’s examples of hostility to 
intruders and lack of hospitality to strangers (see Heinz 1972: 
411-12). Dispute over the location of territory boundaries has 
also been reported among the IKo, causing in one instance a 
fifteen-year estrangement between the members of two neigh­
boring bands (Heinz 1972:411).
The G/wi appear to be somewhat less territorial and exclu­
sionary than the IKo. Relationships between bands are not 
delimited by nexus boundaries, but take the form of a network 
of alliances across the entire G/wi region (Silberbauer 1981: 
178). In contrast to the animosity displayed between band 
nexuses among the IKo, Silberbauer (1972:303) reports that 
among the G/wi “there is no enmity between nonallies, who 
meet quite happily in the territory of a mutual ally.” The 
greater friendliness between band members across the G/wi 
region is paralleled by what appears to be more extensive 
interband mobility. Silberbauer (1981:178) reports that “during 
the period of fieldwork, every band exchanged at least visitors 
with every other band known to me.”
The Nharo, as described by Barnard (1979), are the least 
territorial and the least “nucleated” of all the Bushman groups. 
While the Nharo, like the IKo, recognize the existence of a 
band “cluster” (apparently equivalent to Heinz’s “nexus”), 
“cluster boundaries do not distinguish separate dialects and, 
perhaps more today than in the past, are not always clearly 
defined geographically” (p. 139). Barnard describes a pattern 
of widespread visiting and social ties across the Nharo region. 
While the IKo rarely travel beyond their nexus boundaries, 
“many Nharo do, and they frequently extend their social 
networks to individuals in other band clusters” (p. 141). The 
Nharo have a reputation for hospitality which contrasts 
markedly with the reputation for hostility to strangers reported 
for the IKo (Barnard 1979:139; Heinz 1972:410-12) and which 
is further evidence of the difference in the degree of terri­
toriality and exclusion found in the two groups.
In sum, Barnard (1979:141) says that “the IKo appear to be 
highly territorial and the Nharo (except perhaps in the drier 
western areas) relatively unconcerned with territoriality.” It is 
of particular interest that Barnard notes the possibility of 
greater concern with territoriality among the Nharo who live 
in the drier areas, since this is consistent with the larger trend 
whereby the IKo, who are in the most arid and variable en­
vironment, are the most territorial of the Bushman groups.
Flexible territorial organization and widespread visiting also 
characterize the IKung (see esp. 1972a, 1979; Wiessner 1977; 
also Marshall 1976, Peterson 1979, Yellen 1976, Yellen and 
Harpending 1972). The numerous recent reports on IKung 
land use and territorial organization have given rise to some­
thing of an archetype in the anthropological imagination, 
characterized by nonexclusive, flexibly organized bands having 
highly permeable spatial and social boundaries. Because the 
nature of IKung territorial organization is so well known, I will 
not discuss it further.
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Barnard (1979) considers the Nharo to have the most “fluid” 
and least nucleated spatial organization of the four groups, 
followed in order by the IKung, G/wi, and !Ko. Although I 
would find it difficult to decide whether the !Kung or the 
Nharo are the least nucleated in their spatial organization, I 
am in general agreement with his conclusions and consider 
them directly related to the issue of territoriality. Territorial 
exclusion is brought about in part by limiting marital and social 
ties with people in other bands, since such ties are the vehicle 
that allows outsiders access to territorial resources. The ab­
sence of widespread (internexus) social networks and visiting 
among the !Ko, then, can be seen as an indication of their 
greater tendency to exclude outsiders from territorial resources. 
Their animosity and lack of hospitality to strangers is further 
evidence of the same thing. To summarize, the four Bushman 
groups vary both in their attitudes towards outsiders and in 
the extent of their social and mobility networks, showing the 
most territoriality (the greatest exclusion of outsiders) where 
resources are sparsest and least predictable.
Are larger territories required where resources are sparse and 
unpredictable? Because the arguments about economic defensi­
bility are based on the assumption that this is so, it is worth 
considering whether this relationship holds among the Bushman 
groups. When interpreting the ethnographic literature on this 
subject, it is important to distinguish data on “range” from 
that on “territory.” A territory is an area within which the 
resident controls or restricts access to resources. A range, on 
the other hand, is the total area that the animal actually uses. 
An animal’s territory is usually smaller than its range, and this 
is also the case among the Bushmen, who have various cultural 
means of extending their range into the territories of other 
bands.
Given the environmental data presented earlier, we would 
expect to find the smallest territories among the Nharo and 
!Kung, who have the most abundant resources, followed in 
order by the G/wi and then the !Ko. The Nharo do appear to 
have the smallest territories of the four groups. Barnard (1979: 
140) reports that “their territories are considerably smaller 
than those of other Bushman groups, sometimes averaging 
only about 30 square kilometres in the interior of the ranching 
area. In the southern area they are often much larger.” IKung 
territories inlores) appear to be quite a bit larger, varying 
between about 300 and 600 km2 (Lee 1979:334). Silberbauer’s 
data indicate still larger territories for the G/wi, the territories 
of six G/wi bands averaging 780 km2 with a range of 457-1036 
km2 (Silberbauer 1981:198). I have no data on !Ko territory 
sizes with which to complete this comparison,3 but for the 
three Bushman groups about which we have information 
territories do appear to be smaller where resources (especially 
water resources) are more abundant and predictable.
DISCUSSION
The theory of territoriality developed by animal ecologists 
holds that, where competition exists for resources, territoriality 
is most adaptive where resources are abundant and predictable,
3 Heinz (1972:414) has remarked in passing that “journeys of 60 
to 100 miles undertaken by an entire IKung band, as mentioned by 
Mrs. Marshall (1960:329), are impossible for the IKo because no !Ko 
band has access to resources over such a vast area.” However, this 
statement must be an indication of range, not territory size, since a 
journey of 60 to 100 miles suggests an area on the order of 13,000 km2, 
much larger than the IKung territory sizes of 300 to 600 km.2 The 
fact that the IKo do not have “access to resources over such a vast 
area” is presumably an indication of their more restricted social and 
mobility networks (i.e., of the greater degree of territorial exclusion 
found among them) and tells us something about range, but nothing 
about territory sizes. We might expect to find that range and territory 
become more nearly isomorphic as a group becomes more territorial.
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since such resources require smaller territories and are therefore 
more economical to defend. These arguments might lead us to 
expect the least territoriality among the IKo, who are in a 
region where both food and water are scarcest and least pre­
dictable, and the most territoriality among the IKung and 
Nharo, who are in more well-favored areas. Yet the opposite is 
the case. One relevant factor in accounting for this apparent 
discrepancy is that Bushmen defend territorial resources by 
controlling access to the social group rather than by perimeter 
defense, and the costs of this form of defense are unrelated to 
territory size. The other important factor that must be con­
sidered is the existence of competition; if resources are suffi­
ciently abundant, territoriality may be uneconomical even 
though the costs of defense are low. Both of these factors are 
relevant in the Bushman case.
The ecological arguments suggest that territoriality will be 
economical between two thresholds of resource abundance. As 
resources become sparser and larger territories are needed, 
defense costs increase and at some point may come to outweigh 
the benefits conferred by territoriality. At the other extreme, 
resources may be so abundant in relation to the animal’s 
needs that competition is minimal and there is little or nothing 
to be gained from defending a territory. Whether or not a lower 
threshold of resource abundance exists for human foragers, 
however, depends on their form of territorial defense. Foragers 
who exploit dense and predictable resources need only small 
territories, and they typically defend them by defending the 
boundaries of the territory space itself. The costs of this type 
of territorial defense can be expected to rise with territory size 
and, as resources become increasingly sparse, may reach a 
threshold at which territoriality is no longer economical. For 
foragers who live in areas of sparse and unpredictable resources, 
however, this threshold will not exist. These foragers need very 
large territories, and resources in this case may be more eco­
nomically defended by controlling and limiting access to the 
social group. When outsiders are excluded from the social 
group rather than from the territory space itself, territory size 
is no longer a relevant factor in determining defense costs. 
While the territories of these foragers may become larger as 
resources become sparser, the cost of defending these larger 
territories does not increase.
This argument applies to the Bushman groups discussed 
above, all of which control access to resources through reciprocal 
altruism and social boundary defense. The Bushmen with the 
least abundant and least reliable water supplies do appear to 
have larger territories (although the data are incomplete), but 
because costs are unrelated to territory size there is no lower 
threshold of resource abundance below which territoriality 
becomes uneconomical. The costs of territoriality should be 
about equal for the four groups, in spite of the environmental 
differences between them.
The benefits conferred by territoriality, however, should not 
be equal for the four groups, because they decrease as resources 
become increasingly dense and predictable and may reach a 
point at which they are lower than the costs of territorial 
defense. This upper threshold of resource abundance should be 
as applicable to human as to nonhuman foragers and explains 
the patterning seen in Bushman territoriality. As Brown 
(1964:162) has noted, the value of territoriality “should tend 
to be in proportion to the intensity of competition—defend- 
ability allowing.” Bushmen in the areas where resources are 
scarcest and least predictable should be facing the greatest 
competition and should, therefore, derive the greatest benefits 
from territorial exclusion. Since their costs are no greater, it is 
not surprising to find that these groups exhibit the strongest 
territoriality, that is, the greatest exclusion of outsiders from 
territorial resources. This general trend, whereby the groups 
with the most abundant resources exhibit the least territoriality, 
is echoed by the fact that within all four groups territorial
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the normally territorial !Ko, “an overabundance of any one 
of the important resources may cause territoriality to become 
insignificant during the period of such abundance” (Heinz 
1972:410).
Ideally, data on resource abundance should be taken in 
conjunction with data on population density to determine the 
degree of competition for resources, but there are no density 
figures for either the Nharo or the !Ko. Population density of 
the IKung (.16 persons/km2 [Lee 1968]) is higher than that of 
the G/wi (.05-.07/km2 [Silberbauer 1981, Tanaka 1980]), but 
the data showing greater work effort among the G/wi than 
among the IKung can be taken as indirect evidence of greater 
competition in the G/wi region, their lower density notwith­
standing.
It will be remembered that the IKo, unlike the Nharo, do not 
have marital and social ties with members of other nexuses and 
rarely travel outside the territory of their own nexus. I have 
argued that their more restricted social and mobility networks 
are a means of excluding outsiders from territorial resources and, 
together with other evidence, suggest a greater degree of terri­
toriality among them. It might be asked why the IKo should 
respond to scarcity by closing off ties with outsiders (a terri­
torial response) when such ties, and the interterritorial visiting 
they facilitate, are themselves often used as a means of coping 
with scarcity. The answer to this seeming paradox lies in the 
distinction that must be made between scarcity on the local 
and scarcity on the regional level. Moving in with relatives 
in other areas is a good means of coping with the risk of local 
scarcity (assuming that the chances of scarcity in the different 
local areas within a region are more or less random), but it 
presupposes abundant resources in some neighboring territory 
and can therefore work only in a situation of local scarcity but 
regional abundance. Interterritorial visiting, in other words, is 
essentially a distributional mechanism. When there is scarcity 
on the regional level, this mechanism will no longer work, and 
we can expect the territorial mechanisms of social exclusion to 
come into play.
The notion that resources may be so abundant that there is 
no net gain in defending them is intuitively reasonable. How­
ever, it is based on the assumption that the acquisition of 
resources beyond a certain level does not significantly benefit 
the territory holder or, at any rate, that benefits fall off more 
rapidly than costs. Ebersole (1980) has pointed out that this 
may not always be true for animals, some of which can use 
“extra” food to increase their fitness through such mechanisms 
as larger clutch sizes, faster growth, and so on. For some human 
foragers, such as the Bushmen, it is reasonable to assume that 
resources in excess of those required for maintenance will yield 
few or no additional benefits, and the explanation of the relative 
lack of territoriality among the Nharo and IKung is based on 
this assumption. For other human foragers, however, this may 
not be so. Foragers who store food as a means of protection 
against years of scarcity can make use of extra resources, and 
territoriality may consequently confer benefits at higher levels 
of abundance than would otherwise be the case. Where stored 
resources are used to increase prestige, as was the case for the 
Indians of the Northwest Coast, there may be no upper thresh­
old of resource abundance at all, since in such a case there 
may be no apparent upper limit to the amount of resources 
desired. In areas such as native California and the Northwest 
Coast, therefore, where such storage is important, territoriality 
may continue to confer benefits in even the richest environ­
ments.
In this discussion I have pointed to some aspects of human 
behavior that must be considered in applying the ecological 
theory of territoriality to human foragers. In determining the 
costs of territoriality, we must consider the means by which 
access to resources is controlled, since only then can we ascertain
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whether the costs will be related to resource abundance and 
predictability. In determining benefits, we must consider the 
degree to which storage of extra resources will confer additional 
benefits. Finally, in determining benefits where resources are 
scarce and spatially unpredictable, we must consider whether 
the scarcity exists on a regional or only on a local level. The 
variation in territoriality that has been described for the 
different Bushman groups is consistent with the ecological 
theory of costs and benefits only when these factors are taken 
into consideration.
The cost-benefit theory of territoriality developed by animal 
ecologists has great potential for explaining variation in terri­
toriality among human foragers, but care must be taken when 
applying hypotheses from this theory to our own species. The 
theory has led to the general expectation that dense and pre­
dictable resources, being less costly to defend, will be associated 
with a greater degree of territoriality. This relationship has in 
fact been documented not only for many animal species, but 
also for some human foragers (see Dyson-Hudson and Smith 
1978). Among the four Bushman groups compared here, how­
ever, the opposite pattern is found. I argue that this reflects 
the effect of human culture and cognition on the form (hence 
costs and benefits) of territorial defense and, consequently, on 
the relationships between environmental characteristics and 
the economic defensibility of a territory.
by A l a n  B a r n a r d  
Department of Social Anthropology, University of Edinburgh, 
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Cashdan gives a convincing argument, and I am in agreement 
with her findings. However, some additional points on the 
Bushman data are worth noting.
All areas of the Kalahari have two seasons, wet and dry, 
but the intensity of these seasons, as indicated by differential 
rainfall, varies from place to place. As Cashdan’s discussion 
shows, differential rainfall, together with the variability of 
surface water and water-bearing plants, permits or even 
determines radically differing settlement patterns among Bush­
man peoples. These in turn affect notions of territoriality. To 
expand on Cashdan’s findings, in my view the principle is best 
seen through a consideration of logical possibilities.
Given one absolute distinction (wet season versus dry season) 
and one settlement variable (aggregation versus dispersal), 
there are four logical possibilities: (1) wet-season aggregation, 
drv-season dispersal; (2) wet-season dispersal, dry-season ag­
gregation; (3) wet-season aggregation, dry-season aggregation; 
(4) wet-season dispersal, dry-season dispersal. Interestingly, 
each of these four possibilities is realized by one of the four 
Bushman groups Cashdan describes. The first is represented 
by the G/wi, the second by the IKung, the third (in a relative 
sense) by the Nharo, and the fourth (similarly) by the IKo. 
What is more, to some extent members of at least three of 
these groups (G/wi, Nharo, and IKo) are aware of each other’s 
seasonal cycles. It would be interesting to consider how this 
knowledge of other groups affects their perceptions of terri­
toriality and the territorial boundaries they maintain. This is 
one area in which more fieldwork is needed.




their land with Afrikaner cattle ranchers. The Nharo word for 
“ethnic group” is the same as that for “animal species” au —, 
feminine), and in some southern areas of the ranches the 
Afrikaners seem to be perceived as separate “species” in the 
English sense of that word. Specifically, the Nharo there con­
sider the ranchers and their fenced boundaries irrelevant to the 
“species”-specific, traditional Bushman boundaries which 
divide Nharo bands and band clusters from each other and 
from those of other Bushman groups.
The argument for complexity in this issue could be taken still 
farther if we were to look at hunter-gatherer populations in 
other parts of the world. Mesolithic foragers in Britain, for 
example, had one seasonal distinction (summer/winter) and at 
least two possible variables (aggregation/dispersal and upland/ 
lowland). This set of variables would generate sixteen rather 
than four logical possibilities of seasonal settlement. Only one 
of these (winter lowland aggregation, summer upland dis­
persal) occurs in the traditional “cost-benefit” interpretation 
of the archaeological record, in spite of recent evidence for 
some of the others (see, e.g., Bonsall 1980:468-69). In com­
parison, the Bushman model is relatively simple. Of course, 
there is no way of finding out about Mesolithic British notions 
of territoriality, but this sixteen-possibility model illustrates 
the direction in which one might have to go in order to analyze 
human forager territoriality in general. Conversely, the com­
plications yielded by the Bushman data may help to extricate 
some schools of archaeology, as well as perhaps ecology, from 
strict adherence to cost-benefit theory.
Regarding a related ethnographic point Cashdan raises, I 
would agree that it is very difficult to assess the relative terri­
toriality of the IKung and Nharo, but as I see it this entails 
two problems which are not explicitly dealt with in her paper:
(1) “territoriality” is not a clear-cut, monothetic concept, and
(2) the precontact Nharo settlement pattern is by no means as 
easily ascertained as the IKung one.
On the first problem, the meaning of the word “territorial” 
depends on its context. If a single criterion were to be isolated 
as particularly relevant for Bushman territoriality, I would say 
it is the degree of nucleation (cf. Yellen and Harpending 1972). 
This is a factor which can easily be compared among Bushman 
groups, e.g., by recording the migration of individuals from 
camp to camp. A second criterion would include ideological 
factors, such as concepts of land or resource ownership. A third 
would be the means of physical boundary maintenance, e.g., 
by defense of territory or by avoiding contact with other 
groups. Probably many other criteria could be listed.
On the second problem, the Nharo settlement pattern has 
undergone considerable, if slow, change since the arrival of the 
ranchers in 1898. As Cashdan says, the seasonal cycle before 
that time was probably similar to the IKung pattern described, 
but the tendency in recent years has been towards more perma­
nent aggregation. Partly because of the influence of Herero and 
Tswana pastoralists, this tendency has also been occurring 
among the IKung (Lee 1979:361-64). The difference, though, 
is that the changes in IKung settlement have occurred virtually 
in the presence of their ethnographers, whereas changes in 
Nharo settlement must be inferred from oral history, travelers’ 
tales, and early ethnography (see Barnard 1980).
Finally, a few bibliographical points may be of interest. 
Steyn (1971a, b, 1980, 1981) has done fieldwork on western 
Nharo subsistence ecology, economics, and social structure; 
I was unaware of his study, carried out in 1967-69 and sub­
sequent years, at the time I wrote my comparative paper on 
Bushman settlement patterns (Barnard 1979). In addition, 
Heinz (1979) has now provided a more detailed account of IKo 
territoriality which bears out Cashdan’s generalizations on 
that people, and I have recently given a fuller account of con­
temporary Nharo settlement patterns and notions of terri­
toriality, showing particularly how these have been affected by
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adaptation to life on the cattle ranches (Barnard 1980). 
Guenther (1981) has also contributed to the territoriality debate 
and, in particular, provides a useful review of the Bushmanist 
literature on the subject.
by M. C. B i c c h i e r i
Department of Anthropology, Central Washington University,
Ellensburg, Wash. 98926, U .S.A. 10 v i i i  82 
Cashdan addresses the question of food gatherers’ territoriality 
very ably. The analytical implications of her research, backed 
up with straightforward ethnographic comparisons, shed new 
light on the issue and carry wider significance for anthro­
pological interpretation as a whole.
Cashdan’s concern with model construction and the utiliza- 
ation of nonhuman animal behavior analysis in anthropological 
interpretation deserves some reinforcement. The utility of 
models rests on the clear understanding that they are not 
phenomena, but theoretical constructs that should aim to 
explain and predict the structural and functional nature of 
related phenomena. Similarly, the use of animal behavior 
analysis is a heuristic device. It must, however, clearly take 
into account the fact that human behavior is preponderantly 
learned rather than instinctive. As Cashdan suggests, behavior 
in human collectives is generational and adjustive. This 
significantly affects the population-space-resources relationship; 
that is, unlike other animals, human foraging populations rely 
primarily on social strategies for transgenerational stability in 
relation to space and resources.
I would also propose that predictability is not simply 
“another important environmental variable,” as Cashdan 
writes, but a primary factor that must be related to the total 
adaptive strategy. The more appropriate analytical question 
would be how a culture achieves total operational predictability, 
followed by how territoriality fits into the wider scheme and, 
finally, how defense fits into the population-space-resources 
triad. Given this premise, Cashdan’s interpretation is not car­
ried to its ultimate conclusion. Predictable access to resources 
is the ultimate goal of the group, and unless territoriality and 
its defense are related to it rather than vice versa we will 
continue to have conflicting interpretations of the same data.
The term “nexus” deserves elaboration. Cashdan uses it to 
refer to a network of social relationships, while elsewhere 
(e.g., Silberbauer 1981), it has been used with reference to 
resources. I consider it a potentially useful concept in an overall 
sense, that is, as an essential combination of both social and 
environmental elements within the total strategy of the group, 
as well as in the specific ways it has been applied.
The thrust of the article is that varying concentrations of 
resources will affect the population-space ratio and, conse­
quently, competition for and defense of territory. Territoriality 
can be viewed as a dependent variable of permissive (abundant/ 
concentrated resources) and restrictive (scarce/dispersed re­
sources) environments (Bicchieri 1969) and the correlated 
social nexus devised to deal with them. Concentrated resources 
entail a simple resource nexus easily accessible to intruders and 
therefore make exclusionary defense efficient, while dispersed 
resources entail cognition of a complex resource nexus and 
maximize the efficiency of “reciprocal altruism.” It is, thus, 
the type of resource nexus, rather than the territory itself, with 
respect to which defense efficiency is developed.
Cashdan’s lead in developing a more basic functional lan­
guage must be pursued in order for ethnographic comparisons 
to produce valid human generalizations. The overall predict­
ability of a given strategy as it relates to a specific ecosystem 
must be considered when comparing space use in specific popu- 
lation-resource relationships. The different environmental and 
social nexuses associated with different ecosystems will make 
different defense modes efficient.
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by C h a r l e s  A. B is h o p
Department of Anthropology, State University of New York,
Oswego, N .Y . 13126, Z7.S.A 7 vm  82 
It is a truism that there is a correspondence between the distri­
bution of resources and the distribution of all living things. 
However, insofar as humans manage resources through the 
application of cultural rules or norms, human forms of terri­
toriality can be distinguished from those of other animals. On 
the basis of this premise, Cashdan distinguishes two forms of 
forager territoriality—perimeter defense and social boundary 
defense—and shows how four groups of Bushmen illustrate 
variations in the latter form. It is said that the costs of terri­
toriality among the four groups are about equal, but the 
benefits decrease as “ resources become increasingly dense and 
predictable.” Thus, at some point on this hypothetical con­
tinuum between a situation characterized by relative abun­
dance and predictability and one where ranges are sufficiently 
small to permit perimeter defense, there should be no terri­
toriality. I doubt that this possibility is intended, since it is 
implied (and I agree) that all foragers practice some form of 
resource management. It does, however, reflect an inconsistency 
in the model which, I maintain, is due in part to the inadequacy 
of the data base. As Cashdan admits, the evidence “will not 
permit a really reliable test of the ecological arguments.” In­
deed, she uses too few cultural data, no historical data that 
might help to explain the development of the different terri­
torial forms, and no demographic data. Further, when she uses 
the term “resources” it is evident that she means subsistence 
resources. She doesn’t seem to consider the possibility that 
forms of territoriality can be based upon nonfood resources 
and that the distribution of these can alter the spatial distribu­
tion of human groups in ways that can lessen subsistence 
efficiency and/or risks. For example, the quest for trade goods 
by Subarctic Indians often took precedence over more practical 
subsistence habits.
Nor does she consider the historical provenience of Bushman 
territorial variations. Recent forms may be accommodations 
to conditions generated by pastoralism, which has been prac­
ticed in the Kalahari for centuries (Schrire 1980:25-28). Per­
haps the wild game biomass was greater prior to competition 
with domestic animals for pasture and/or overhunting. Silber- 
bauer (1981:289) also mentions a series of epidemics that 
periodically reduced both human and animal populations from 
the mid-19th century on. The IKo data in particular suggest 
interference. The system described by Heinz operates “in a 
context of boundaries, roads, boreholes, and farms” (Schrire 
1980:14). The IKo speak a language related to “two remnant 
languages spoken by a few survivors in the Republic of South 
Africa” and to the “formerly widespread Cape Bushmen 
languages (Traill 1973)” (Lee 1976:7). This evidence implies 
that the IKo themselves are composed of a number of remnant 
groups—band clusters or nexuses—which are trying to eke out 
a living in the context of modern civilization. Indeed, the nu­
clear family level of territorial organization has a parallel 
in the postcontact Northern Algonkian family trapping terri­
tory system (Bishop 1970, 1978). And, contrary to Cashdan, 
IKo band nexuses do appear to protect territorial perimeters 
through mutual avoidance of a “no man’s land” (Barnard 
1979:138). Thus, while clearly there is a relationship between 
resource densities and territoriality among the IKo and other 
Bushman groups, we can’t be certain that it doesn’t reflect 
adaptations to nonforaging activities until more historical 
work is done.
Do foragers control access to resources by controlling access 
to the social group through such rituals as greeting ceremonies? 
Maybe, but it is necessary to specify what resources are being 
defended. Peterson, from whom Cashdan gets the idea, argues 
that in Australia clan totemism “is the main territorial spacing 
mechanism” (1972:28) and that such landowning ideologies
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“code the distribution of resource nexuses” (1979:121). How­
ever, these ideologies pertain not to subsistence resources, but 
to localized cultural symbols, clan designs, and other such 
emblems (Peterson 1972:28-29). I suggest that these symbols, 
along with women, are localized in space to permit the senior 
males to control access to them. As Peterson (1972:28) says: 
“The only wealth that can be accumulated is ritual knowledge 
and wives.” Aggressive behavior is associated with defense of 
these, not subsistence resources, although the localization of 
sacred sites and the stated preference of individuals to live 
near these can have ecological consequences. Thus, while 
greeting ceremonies may define social boundaries, it is doubtful 
whether the defense of these is intended to be a means of 
restricting access to food resources, especially since persons 
often forage beyond clan estate boundaries. The argument 
requires a high degree of isomorphism between the social 
group and the territory exploited, one not supported by the 
data.
Intergroup cooperation involving information exchange and 
mutual decisions concerning where foraging may occur are, as 
Cashdan states, simply an attempt to avoid competition, that 
is, a form of subsistence management. Given seasonal, annual, 
and regional flexibility in group size among foragers and inter­
locking kin ties, one may ask: Who would be excluded? Perhaps 
persons suspected of witchcraft or foul play—but here the 
reasons for exclusion may have little to do with the gastric needs 
of the group. Because band societies value leisure, social 
mechanisms which reduce subsistence efforts and/or risks, 
such as population regulation, arise before subsistence re­
source defense becomes necessary. Territorial restrictions on 
subsistence resources, however, may develop among groups 
whose habitat has been desecrated, as perhaps was the case 
among the IKo. Perimeter defense, I suggest, is a product of 
resource depletion, geographical circumscription, exchange- 
dependency relationships, or some combination of these condi­
tions, or it develops when social ranking and trade stimulate 
population growth to increase the production of exchange goods 
and foods for feasts. In the latter case, perimeter defense of non­
subsistence resources is extended to include certain foods, as on 
the Northwest Coast. Indeed, the distinction between resource 
management and perimeter defense is nicely illustrated among 
the early 19th-century Carrier Indians (Bishop n.d.). Rights 
to beaver tracts involving perimeter defense were possessed by 
nobles and transmitted matrilineally. Beaver flesh, however, 
was not a basic food and was consumed only at occasional 
feasts hosted by the village nobles. Pelts were traded for luxury 
items either from Northwest Coast Indian trading partners or 
from European trading posts. Salmon, the basic food, were 
caught at strategically located sites, usually near a village. If 
salmon failed at one location, the villagers simply moved tem­
porarily to another where they had kin ties. Occasionally, 
intervillage hostility prevented access to a particular site, but 
this hostility was generated by gambling activities or by com­
petition for women, not by competition for food. The question, 
then, is whether resource management involving intercom­
munity cooperation is a form of territoriality in the absence of 
certain rules of exclusivity. I argue that where foraging popu­
lations are adjusted so as to maximize efficiency and/or reduce 
risks, and where overproduction for ceremonial or exchange 
purposes is not regular or frequent, the ideal of nonterritoriality 
suggested in Cashdan’s model can be, and indeed once was, a 
social reality. I further argue that perimeter defense never 
existed among pristine egalitarian foragers.
While foragers managed their subsistence resources, kin 
networks and reciprocity prevented territorial exclusivity. Even 
where groups of radically different origin, such as the Inuit 
and the Subarctic Indians, shared a frontier, it wasn’t compe-
Cashdan: t e r r i t o r i a l i t y  in  h u m a n  f o r a g e r s
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tition for food, but rather the fear of witchcraft that defined 
the boundary. Thus, while the distribution of foraging groups 
in space is unquestionably related to the distribution of food 
resources, the benefits of territoriality needn’t increase as 
resources become less dense and less predictable given certain 
demographic and cultural conditions. There is no evidence to 
suggest that the Australians of the desert zones are any more 
territorial than those of the grasslands and forests.
There is a growing myth, one founded on the high quality 
of field research produced by the Harvard Kalahari Research 
Group, that a detailed knowledge of the Bushmen will answer 
most of our questions about hunter-gatherers. However, until 
these studies acquire historical depth, data pertaining to other 
areas, particularly North America and Australia, will, in some 
cases, be more relevant.
by V a l d a  B l u n d e l l
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Carleton Univer­
sity , Ottawa, Ont., Canada K 1S  5B6. 10 vm  82 
Cashdan’s stimulating and insightful article makes it clear that 
models of animal territoriality cannot be uncritically applied to 
human foragers. The idea from animal ecology that territori­
ality will be found where its benefits exceed its (defense) costs 
leads, according to Cashdan, to the “general expectation that 
dense and predictable resources, being less costly to defend, 
will be associated with a greater degree of territoriality.” As 
Cashdan demonstrates, Bushman groups reverse this relation­
ship because, as culture bearers, they practice social boundary 
defense rather than the perimeter defense of certain human and 
nonhuman species. They are able to maintain large territories 
in an environment of relatively scarce resources because the 
costs of social boundary defense (in contrast to perimeter 
defense) do not dramatically increase with territory size. Thus 
we should not be misled to think that Bushmen are not terri­
torial simply because they do not “look” territorial in the 
context of animal ecological theories.
I agree with Cashdan that we must fully take account of the 
cultural and cognitive aspects of human territorial behaviour. 
On the basis of my own fieldwork, I have described Northwest 
Australian territoriality as a set of ideas held in the minds of 
these foragers and have proceeded analytically to consider the 
ways such cognitive models are expressed on the ground, given 
the nature of environmental, demographic, and other kinds of 
variability (Blundell 1980, 1982; Blundell and Layton 1978).
Foragers with contrasting forms of territoriality will expe­
rience different ecological relationships. Cashdan argues that 
“because territoriality among [perimeter-defending] groups is 
not unlike that found in other species, the ecological arguments 
developed for these other species should also be applicable.” 
However, the fact that such groups “look” territorial should 
not mislead us. Ecological relations similar to those among non­
human species may well obtain, but we should not conclude 
that they exist because perimeter defense in humans is somehow 
less cultural than social boundary defense. The recognition by 
the perimeter-defending Vedda of symbolic territory markers 
on trees or their interrogation or even shooting of trespassers 
is no less cultural than the recognition by Australian social 
boundary defenders that kin links must be asserted in order to 
gain entry into another group’s territory. In both cases we are 
dealing with cultural systems expressed behaviourally. All 
foragers, to use Cashdan’s phrase, “play the game,” and the 
“game” is a cultural one.
When Cashdan states that social boundary defending 
foragers “look” nonterritorial to animal ecologists because 
among such foragers “social units do not clearly correspond to 
territorial units, particularly over the short term,” she seems 
to mean by “social unit” some observed residential unit. How­
ever, observations of residence, like those of the cutting of 
pictures into tree trunks, relate to behaviours which only in­
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completely reflect the cognitively held territorial structure. My 
own view is that, like units of land in a territorial model, land- 
using groups such as Australian bands are cultural constructs 
held in the minds of the foragers. As such, they are only 
imperfectly expressed on the ground in observable residential 
behaviour (Blundell 1980; cf. Peterson 1979 for the Bushmen 
and Tanner 1973 for the Cree).
Cashdan’s analysis leads us to ask why foragers culturally 
construct differing models of territoriality (and, it would seem, 
a limited number of models). It suggests that when foragers 
whose resources are sparse and unpredictable have cultural 
models that link groups to land and encourage reciprocal 
exchange networks, social boundary defense will be viable. In 
contrast, when foragers richer in resources have more encapsu­
lating territorial models, perimeter defense will be viable.
Finally, it may be worth looking further at the “costs” of 
territorial defense among various foragers. Cashdan’s argu­
ment that territory size will not greatly affect social boundary 
defense costs is well made. Again, my own work among North­
west Australian social boundary defenders suggests that their 
costs include the expenditure of ritual energy and symbolic 
labour (Blundell 1982). This energy is expended not just to 
maintain the cultural (including territorial) system, but also to 
deal with breakdowns in the system (resulting from such events 
as local group extinctions). One avenue of future research might 
be further consideration of the ways that foragers with different 
kinds of territorial systems maintain and transmit them.
by J e f f r e y  E h r e n r e i c h
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of
Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, Iowa 50514, U.S.A. 10 vm  82 
It is noteworthy and commendable that Cashdan’s work has 
emphasized the significance of resource scarcity (including vari­
ation and fluctuation) in interpreting the vast literature on the 
San peoples of the Kalahari. This paper makes an important 
contribution to the body of theory which treats scarcity 
directly or implicitly as a critical factor in analyzing human 
adaptation and cultural ecology (e.g., Boserup 1965; Carneiro 
1970, 1974; Harner 1970, 1975; Harris 1974, 1977; Piddocke 
1965). Specifically, Cashdan correlates the application of 
sociocultural mechanisms used to control access to resources 
with the degree of availability of important resources and con­
cludes that greater use of such controls will be made in areas 
where resources are least. The analysis moves beyond the recent 
work of Dyson-Hudson and Smith (1978), which promotes the 
idea, derived from cost-benefit ecological theory, that humans 
will defend economic resources when they are “sufficiently 
abundant and predictable in space and time.” The strength of 
Cashdan’s approach is its direct acknowledgment of the 
uniqueness of culture in human ecological adaptation. She sug­
gests that, “like many human foragers, the Bushmen control 
access to territorial resources in ways not found in other 
animals” and “that these differences in the means of territorial 
defense may alter the expected relationships between environ­
mental variables and territorial costs and benefits.” I wholly 
concur with this view.
I believe that Cashdan’s paper significantly increases our 
understanding of the sociocultural methods employed by 
human societies as they adapt to their environments. I have 
only one misgiving about the work. It seems regrettable that the 
analysis is framed in reference to the issue of “territoriality.” 
No matter how carefully or broadly this concept is defined, it 
conjures up a biological imperative. It serves no useful theoret­
ical purpose that I can perceive to lump together under the 
heading “territoriality” what might be more accurately dis­
tinguished as “control of,” “use of,” “defense of,” and “access 
to” a given territory, particularly when the distinctions between 
biology and culture are at risk of being badly muddled. The 
sociocultural mechanisms used by San and other peoples to con­
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trol access to scarce resources are unique in the animal world, as 
Cashdan herself points out. On this basis, I believe Cashdan’s 
data argue best for an understanding of human adaptation 
outside the realm of animal models of territoriality. Like the 
idea of the “naked ape,” territoriality is a concept “we could 
live without” (Pilbeam 1982).
In support of Cashdan’s general position, I have collected 
data recently on the Coaiquer Indians of Ecuador which ex­
tend her analysis beyond the range of foragers. The Coaiquer 
are horticulturalists, heavily dependent on plantains produced 
by a slash-and-mulch technique in a region continuously too wet 
for burning. Coaiquer social structure, however, is remarkably 
close to what is regularly found among hunter-gatherers (Harris 
1980, Murphy 1979), with some striking similarities to that of 
the San peoples (Lee 19726, 1979). Like the IKung San, the Coai­
quer are extremely egalitarian (cf. Roberts and Brintnall 1982: 
37-68), living in a highly dispersed settlement pattern of extend­
ed-family households, each an independent socioeconomic unit. 
Sibling groups of brothers and sisters and their spouses are the 
principal building blocks of these extended families. The 
Coaiquer practice a period of trial marriage in which residence 
is bilocal, alternating between the households of their primary 
kin groups. There is a preference for marrying close kin, par­
ticularly parallel and cross-cousins, and a strong tendency 
toward sibling exchanges (distinguished from brother-sister 
exchanges) between Coaiquer households. Descent is reckoned 
bilaterally, with emphasis on the personal kindred (cf. Harner 
1972:97-98). There are no established lineages based on genera­
tional descent. Social structure is characterized by a high 
degree of flexibility.
The population I worked with had migrated to Ecuador three 
generations ago, principally to secure greater access to land, 
which had become increasingly scarce in Colombia. Under 
conditions of land scarcity caused by a growing population and 
encroachment by an expanding pioneer frontier, the Coaiquer 
in Colombia strongly emphasized marriages between very close 
kin, especially parallel-cousin marriages (see Osborn 1968). 
Such marriage alliances served to facilitate land rights of mar­
riage partners by strengthening their claims to inheritance. 
The result was effectively to limit and control access to scarce 
land and to keep it from falling into the hands of those not 
closely related to the sibling group. In contrast, the Coaiquer 
I studied in Ecuador had been, for two to three generations, in 
a relatively open land situation. The tendency for marriage 
between close kin had fallen off dramatically. While the ideal 
of marriage between close kin persisted, the degree of pressure 
to achieve such unions had diminished.
In the last ten years, the Ecuadorian situation has shifted to 
accelerated pressure on the land from outsiders and a popu­
lation upswing. The data indicate that, once again, there is an 
increased pressure for, and an actual rise in, marriages between 
close kin. What this suggests, then, is that the social structure 
of marriage, residence patterns, and kinship serve to regulate 
and control access to land. In times of scarcity, the mechanisms 
are rigorously applied; when land is available, they are relaxed. 
The flexibility of such a system has clear-cut adaptive benefits 
and supports Cashdan’s basic ecological premises.
by M a t h i a s  G u e n t h e r  
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, W ilfrid Laurier 
University, Waterloo, Ont., Canada N 2L 3C5. 9 v i i i  82 
Cashdan’s article is a valuable contribution to the ecological 
study of hunter-gatherers in general and of Bushman (or San) 
hunter-gatherers specifically. The predominant hunter-gatherer 
researchers have been anthropologists, virtually all of whom 
have had occasion to play with the notion of territoriality 
because of the strong ecological orientation that is built into 
hunting-gathering research. The concept derives from ethology,
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a subfield of zoology of which the majority of anthropologists 
have inadequate knowledge. As a result, their formulations on 
territoriality and their analytic application of this concept to 
hunting-gathering groups have the tendency to be somewhat 
simplistic, loose, or uninformed. For example, Heinz, in his 
important article on IKo territoriality, only once presents a 
definition of the concept: “intolerance confined to space” 
(Heinz 1972:406). While catchy and beguiling, this overly 
general and enigmatic definition is neither explained nor 
elaborated in any way. Cashdan evidently has an excellent 
grasp of the zoological literature on the concept (focusing on 
the cost-benefit models current in ethology and sociobiology), 
and she brings this expertise to bear on her thorough examina­
tion of territoriality in the context of human hunting-gathering 
societies.
Regarding Bushman ecological studies, the general contribu­
tion of this paper is that it clarifies the debate on Bushman 
territoriality which has recently been reopened, especially 
in European anthropology. By attributing strong territoriality 
to all Bushman groups, Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Heinz (both work­
ing amongst the IKo) have strongly polarized the debate, 
which, hitherto, had presented the Bushmen on the whole as 
rather nonterritorial (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 19746, 1975, 1978; Heinz 
1972, 1975; Schmidbauer 1973; Guenther 1981). Painstakingly 
identifying the ecological (and resultant cultural) differences 
between four Botswana Bushman groups—all of them cul­
turally closely similar and relatively close geographically— 
Cashdan shows that territorial patterns vary quite widely 
among them. Her paper exposes the hastiness and inaccuracy 
of generalizing from one Bushman group to all Bushmen, since 
it shows how even slight ecological variations, experienced by 
the “same” ethnic entity of hunter-gatherers, may significantly 
alter their economic and social patterns of behaviour.
I have one slight reservation concerning the ethnographic 
section of the article. The material presented on the Bushmen 
leans rather heavily on Barnard’s (1979) paper, which examines 
the modes of territoriality of the same four Bushman groups 
that Cashdan selects for her analysis (albeit with a totally 
different theoretical stance; indeed, Barnard’s paper is pri­
marily descriptive and low-key in its theoretical examination 
of the ethnographic material). I think it would have been 
more meaningful, and an enrichment of the Bushman ethnog­
raphy, had the author presented the data on territoriality she 
has gathered herself amongst the //Gana. Perhaps these might 
have replaced the Nharo data, which are in fact very scant. 
Virtually all of the Ghanzi Nharo have been sedentary farm 
labourers and marginal food-producers for some five or six 
generations. Their patterns of territoriality have not been and 
cannot be observed with nearly the degree of thoroughness and 
empirical directness as has been the case with the other three 
groups, all extant hunter-gatherers whose ecological and social 
organization has been studied firsthand. The / / Gana, too, are 
such a group, and the presentation of original field data on the 
topic of spatial organization would, in my opinion, have been 
more valuable than data that are primarily “memory culture” 
reconstructions (notwithstanding the contribution of these 
latter data to the theoretical argument).
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by A n n e t t e  H a m i l t o n  
Macquarie University, Sydney, iV.S.PF. 2113, Australia. 
6 v i i i  82
Cashdan’s paper joins the ranks of those whose paradigm 
evolved in the heady days of the sixties; two decades later, the 
debates about hunter-gatherer territoriality continue to inspire 
a remarkable number of scholars. If one accepts the contem­
porary necessity for such endeavours, then this is a worthy
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addition to the field: neatly organised, precise, original enough, 
and a useful corrective to mechanistic “cost-benefit” analyses 
derived from animal studies.
However, it is difficult to feel enthusiastic about these ques­
tions today, especially from the perspective of Australia, where 
the intricacies of human-land relations are emerging in land- 
claim courts through Aboriginal testimony under cross-exami­
nation, in the process demanding some dramatic reconsidera­
tions of all sorts of received anthropological wisdoms. It cannot 
be denied that the basic premise of evolutionary ecology is that 
foragers are more like animals than anyone else; otherwise, why 
are animal models of territoriality so relentlessly applied to 
them? Yet the application of cost-benefit analyses suggests that 
the fundamental determinants of forager life—where and with 
whom one lives—derive from the same parameters used in 
modern businesses. No doubt the Aboriginal people currently 
briefing their legal advisers would be amazed and perhaps 
alarmed to think that their law came down to such an extraor­
dinary conjunction. Cashdan’s paper, however, takes it all for 
granted.
Even accepting the paradigm, however, there remain some 
troubling questions. Cost-benefit theory must have behind it 
the notion that certain “strategies” are more advantageous 
than others. But one must enquire: advantageous to whom? 
To “the group”? To each separate group, operating on homeo­
static principles? To certain families, or even individuals? To 
the gene pool as a whole? If foragers all lived in enclosed self- 
sustaining groups or fixed territories, the answer would be 
obvious. But how many do?
Cashman’s demonstration that access to the social group is 
the prime determinant of territorial access in “Bushman” 
groups could be extended to Aboriginal groups without difficulty. 
It would be much harder to find any Aboriginal examples of 
perimeter defense. Even where “territories” are small and 
clearly recognised and resources abundant, it is always the 
social group which determines access to resources—provided, 
as Myers (1982) has demonstrated, one “always asks.” Access 
to ritual resources is, however, much more clearly controlled 
and considered much more important. While this too has 
definite consequences for the people using the land, it hardly 
fits any of the animal models—and, indeed, why should it?
In the last analysis, to specify the determinants and mecha­
nisms of human territoriality one must have access to the ideas 
people have about rights. The Australian evidence is changing 
because of the testimony of Aborigines themselves; one wonders 
how our concepts of territoriality would alter if “Bushmen” 
and others were able to present their views in a similarly 
rigorous enquiry.
by H e n r y  C. H a r p e n d i n g
Department of Anthropology, University of New Mexico,
Albuquerque, N .M . 87131, U .S.A. 5 vii 82 
Anthropologists agree that humans are unique among animals. 
Unfortunately, many who are attempting to link anthropology 
with other biological sciences do not confront this uniqueness 
in any creative way. Both sociobiologists and cultural ecologists 
too often appropriate models created to explain birds, trees, or 
fish and use them to generate silly hypotheses to “test.” The 
important strength of Cashdan’s work is her incorporation of 
human cognitive abilities and memory into a new theory of 
territoriality.
The human pattern seems to me to be derived from our 
peculiar (among mammals) social organization of groups of pair 
bonds. Some peoples have weak or transient groups, some have 
weak and transient pairing, but all peoples have some of each. 
Everyone, then, has a father and a mother, thus two whole sets 
of kin. When this is combined with incest avoidance and with 
a highly developed memory for conspecifics, the result is 
spatially dispersed social links not clearly present in other
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mammals. Birdsell (1968) demonstrated a modal size of about 
500 for regional social sets in hunter-gatherers. In my own 
fieldwork I could detect no discrete linguistic clusters in IKung 
Bushmen, but the mean marriage distance incorporated 500 to 
600 people, just as Birdsell found in Australia. Cashdan shows 
how this larger reticulum of social ties can lead to qualitatively 
new and different spatial organization not anticipated by cur­
rent models in ecology.
I would criticize Cashdan for posing her problem in terms of 
what groups do rather than in terms of what individuals do. 
This focus leads to unnecessary semantic and substantive con­
fusion, as for example in describing “fluid groups” among IKung 
and other such peoples. The relevant phenomena, as she points 
out in the corpus of her theoretical argument, are the manipu­
lation of kinship and reciprocal links by the individual partici­
pants. These interactions generate the regularities of spatial 
organization and territoriality. Finer understanding of regional 
organization will proceed from respect for the underlying 
local dynamics.
by N a n c y  H o w e l l
Department of Sociology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ont.,
Canada M 5S 1A1. 5 vm  82 
Cashdan makes two contributions to my understanding of the 
ways that population density is regulated and maintained in 
hunter-gatherer societies.
The first contribution is in the area of data use. One is used 
to seeing the IKung data used as the end point of a continuum 
of societies from “least to most” on some criterion; Cashdan 
breaks this stereotyped use of the IKung by comparing them 
with three closely related groups. Her use of the term “Bush­
men” for these groups is odd and irritating. I thought that 
scholars had agreed to substitute “San” for that derogatory 
term. It also seems odd that she does not draw upon her own 
direct observations of the //Ganakwe to extend the analysis 
to one more group. In general, however, her use of the avail­
able data on population, resources, density, and social organi­
zation strikes me as original and useful. By comparing the oft- 
cited IKung with groups closely matched on environment, 
economic organization, and culture, Cashdan uses the IKung 
as a data point, not a metaphor—a practice much to be en­
couraged. In this comparison, she produces some unexpected 
observations and nonobvious perspectives, in which the IKung 
look rich, not poor, and, like the members of an exclusive club, 
motivated to find ways to exclude others.
The second contribution is the theoretical or conceptual 
point on the functional equivalence of territorial defense and 
group membership defense. Borrowing from Peterson, she 
develops the idea that there are two variables to be manipulated 
when the ratio of land (representing resources) to people is a 
concern. Perimeter defense of a territory is a mechanism that 
will work when the1 only means of entering a defined population 
is by birth, the only way of leaving by death. But when changes 
in the definition of group membership are possible—marriage, 
adoption, immigration, and visiting are examples—it is not 
relevant to defend the borders. That seems to me to be a real 
insight into the ways in which human population density 
manipulation is more complicated than that of animals. Com­
bined with the description of the four San groups and their 
resources, it is a valuable contribution to our understanding of 
how these groups are different and how their differences 
develop and are maintained.
It is clear from Cashdan’s article that what at first glance 
seems to be a simple matter of applying models of animal ter- 
ritorality to humans is not so simple. The number of variables 
that enter into the description of differences between groups is 
large, and an additional long list of variables has been im­
plicitly “controlled for” by comparing carefully matched 
groups. Cashdan’s work shows that we cannot be confident of
c u r r e n t  a n t h r o p o l o g y
finding the needed data in the literature to test models on 
even relatively well-known societies. A satisfying specification 
of the process of density maintenance seems still far away.
by E r i c  A l d e n  S m ith
Department of Anthropology, University of Washington,
Seattle, Wash. 98195, U .S.A. 12 vn 82 
Cashdan’s paper makes some useful contributions to a very 
worthwhile goal—adapting ecological cost-benefit models to the 
explanation of the diversity of human systems of spatial organi­
zation. I certainly agree that the models and theories of spatial 
organization currently available in evolutionary ecology (e.g., 
Davies 1978, Brown and Orians 1970), although instructive, 
are insufficient to this task and that certain unique qualities 
of human societies resulting from symbolic communication and 
cultural transmission must affect the expected patterns of 
human spatial organization. My main reservations about this 
paper concern two matters: the advisability of treating social 
boundary defense as a form of territoriality and the absence of 
formal models and explicit hypotheses that could be tested 
with quantitative data in a precise way.
As Cashdan notes, “territoriality” has been defined in a 
multitude of ways. She favors a fairly broad definition empha­
sizing control over resource allocation by the resident group. 
In contrast, I would restrict the term to systems characterized 
by the exclusive use of a spatially fixed and clearly bounded area 
by some means of defense or communication (cf. Dyson-Hudson 
and Smith 1978:23). Hence, Cashdan sees the systems of recip­
rocal access of Bushmen and others as a form of territoriality, 
distinct from but functionally equivalent to systems of perim­
eter defense, while by my restrictive definition only the latter 
is territoriality.
As in any semantic dispute within science, the central issue 
should be which definitional scheme is most productive in 
guiding the development of theory that explains empirical pat­
terns. For both Cashdan and myself, the relevant functional 
issue is the adaptive significance of alternative ways of mapping 
people onto resources, so we should in principle be able to agree 
on the most appropriate way to define territoriality. In essence, 
we should want to classify systems of spatial organization with 
the same adaptive function(s) under this label, distinguishing 
them from systems with different adaptive functions. Is social 
boundary defense with reciprocal access functionally equivalent 
to perimeter defense? Peterson (1975) has argued that it is in 
that both function to regulate population density. This argu­
ment, however, is based on a notion of group selection developed 
by Carr-Saunders (1922) and Wynne-Edwards (1962) which is 
inconsistent with the generally accepted tenets of evolutionary 
theory (Williams 1966, Smith 1976; cf. Wade 1978). Cashdan 
does not repeat Peterson’s line of argument, instead pointing 
to the effect of both perimeter defense and reciprocal access in 
limiting access to resources. By this broad criterion, however, 
we would have to include any institutions or ceremonies that 
restricted resource utilization under the rubric of territoriality. 
Effects should not be equated with adaptive function.
If we look at the costs and benefits of these two systems of 
spatial organization at the individual level, we notice a marked 
asymmetry: the benefits of reciprocal access systems are dis­
tributed among both residents and outsiders (as Cashdan her­
self points out), while in perimeter defense systems only the 
residents benefit. Two sorts of reciprocity appear to be involved 
in the social boundary systems: information exchange and 
reciprocal access itself. First, visitors are given information on 
the location of resources and told where to forage (thus helping 
residents keep track of which areas are being depleted through 
foraging, so that their own foraging effort can be efficiently 
allocated, in a manner similar to that modeled by Cody [1971; 
see Smith 1981:44]). Second, a system of reciprocal access to 
different areas is established such that over time people can
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count on neighboring groups to grant them access to (and 
information on) resource areas in response to asynchronous 
local fluctuations in resource density. But all of this is very 
different from perimeter defense (what I would call “true terri­
toriality”), in which the residents are interested in exclusive use, 
not efficient mapping of people onto resources via a system of 
reciprocal access. The first system is one of reciprocity, suitable 
for situations of fluctating and unpredictable resources; the 
latter system is nonreciprocal, exclusionary, and adapted to 
cases in which the resource base is dependable (Dyson-Hudson 
and Smith 1978). Hence, the two systems are not functional 
equivalents, and we gain little by considering them so. How­
ever, they are both systems of spatial organization and re­
source management and in that sense are worthy of comparison.
The primary goal of both ecologists and anthropologists con­
cerned with explanation is to account for the existence of very 
diverse systems by means of general, rigorous, and parsimo­
nious theories. Contemporary evolutionary ecology (Pianka
1978, Krebs and Davies 1978, May 1981, Stearns 1982) has 
advanced theory development rapidly by building formal 
models, deducing precise hypotheses from these, and testing 
these predictions with quantitative data, revising or rejecting 
the models when results warrant it. In contrast, ecological 
anthropologists, when venturing beyond empirical generaliza­
tions, tend to rely on rather loosely framed “plausibility argu­
ments.” Cashdan’s effort is better than most in this regard but 
still suffers from an absence of formal models and explicit 
hypotheses. It would be difficult or impossible to falsify the 
“economic defensibility model” as modified by Cashdan. The 
currency with which costs and benefits are to be assessed is not 
explicitly defined. Territoriality is expected when resources are 
dense and predictable (perimeter defense), when they are 
dense but unpredictable (surpluses are stored), and when they 
are scarce and unpredictable (social boundary defense)— 
whether the unpredictability is regional (IKo) or localized 
(IKung). Not only that, but Cashdan agrees that some human 
foragers (many Great Basin Shoshone, for example) are non­
territorial, as discussed by Dyson-Hudson and Smith (1978). 
If increased resource abundance and predictability lead to 
perimeter defense territoriality, while decreased abundance and 
predictability lead to social boundary defense territoriality, 
when do we predict the situation described by Stewart (1938) 
for Great Basin Shoshone, one of fluid group composition and 
absence of land tenure? Cashdan’s arguments are simply too 
vague to allow unambiguous predictions about human spatial 
organization, let alone their testing. We all need to strive to 
improve the quality of theory building and theory testing in 
anthropology. While it would be foolish to ape the explanatory 
efforts of evolutionary ecology, I believe ecological anthro­
pologists have much to learn from this source, in terms of both 
method and substance.
by H i d e a k i  T e r a s h im a  
Faculty of Education, University of Fukui, Bunkyo 3-9-1, 
Fukui, Japan. 7 vm  82 
Cashdan explains well some characteristics of territoriality 
among the Bushmen by developing the idea of social boundary 
defense. For example, by considering only the costs and benefits 
of social boundary defense, we can understand why the IKo, 
inhabiting an area of very scarce and unpredictable resources, 
are able to maintain strong territoriality. In her argument on 
the relevance of cost-benefit theory to the explanation of the 
variation in territoriality among the Bushmen, however, there 
are some important problems on the level of the data. I would 
like to point out two of them:
First, Cashdan, along with Barnard (1979), referring only to 
Silberbauer, concludes that the G/wi are less territorial than
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the IKo but more so than the IKung. This conclusion is not at 
all secure because Tanaka, the other G/wi ethnographer, gives 
a very different description of G/wi territoriality. While 
Silberbauer (1981:138) says that a G/wi band is a community 
occupying a defined territory and controlling the exploitation 
of the resources of that territory, Tanaka (1980:94) says that 
Central Kalahari San (i.e., the G/wi and the //Gana) resi­
dential groups have neither territory nor fixed membership. He 
also writes that they may camp wherever there is food within 
their broad range, selecting their sites in the light of the loca­
tions of other groups (Tanaka 1980:121). Thus we find two 
rather different territorial strategies among the G/wi, the 
one described by Silberbauer being rather close to the strategy 
of the IKo and the one described by Tanaka being very close 
to that of the IKung. To what can this difference be attributed? 
Before advancing an ecological argument, we need to consider 
this problem.
Second, making the distinction between scarcity on the local 
and scarcity on the regional level, Cashdan explains why the 
IKo should respond to the scarcity of their environment by 
limiting social ties with outsiders. I think her discussion at this 
point is premature; we do not have sufficient evidence that the 
IKo are subject to regional scarcity and the others only to 
local scarcity. So far as the rainfall data are concerned, the 
environmental conditions of Lone Tree appear very close to 
those of p^Kade.
by P o l l y  W i e s s n e r
Max-Planck-Institut fur Humanethologie, 8131 Seewiesen,
Federal Republic of Germany. 2 v i i i  82 
Cashdan’s extension of animal models to make them applicable 
to human foragers is a most welcome contribution to hunter- 
gatherer studies. It emphasizes the importance of social group 
boundary defense (Peterson 1975), rather than perimeter 
defense, and is sensitive to the fact that animal models cannot 
directly be applied to humans, but must be adapted to our 
cognitive and cultural capacities. However, before ecological 
models are applied to a test case such as that of the San, it 
would be valuable to consider the influence of past and present 
relations with surrounding pastoralists. Most San groups today 
live side by side with pastoralists or ranchers who have a pro­
found influence on their lives and patterns of land use (Guenther
1979, Lee 1979, Schrire 1980). Relations with pastoralists vary 
radically, as does the availability of domesticated resources 
which have been introduced to the San. For example, the IKung 
live in friendly symbiosis with neighboring Tswana and Herero 
(Lee 1979); the Nharo are, for the most part, permanently 
settled on ranches in the Ghanzi area (Guenther 1979), where 
they gather and are employed but no longer engage in regular 
hunting; and the IXo live near, and at certain times of the 
year with, the Kalagadi, with whom relations are often strained. 
In view of these differences, distribution of domesticated re­
sources as well as traditional ones should be taken into con­
sideration when discussing patterns of land use.
In addition, because the history of contact between San and 
other pastoralists has often been conflict-ridden, attitudes to­
wards strangers and outsiders are not necessarily results of the 
internal systems of land allocation, but are more likely to be 
the outcome of past and present relations with other groups. 
The IXo group studied by Heinz, for instance, has had un­
usually bad experiences with ranchers ensuing from a past inci­
dent of cattle theft (Heunemann, personal communication), 
while the Herero in the IKung area, unlike many pastoralists, 
have tried to prevent cattle theft by befriending the IKung and 
offering them regular and generous economic support in return 
for labour (Lee 1979). Thus the IKung’s openness and the IXo’s 
hostility towards strangers may be a factor of history and not 
one of territoriality as Cashdan defines it.
When the effects of present and past contact are removed, I
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question whether one San group can be said to be more terri­
torial than another. Certainly the organization of access to 
land is radically different between, say, the IXo and the IKung, 
but both have systems for opening access to some and excluding 
others. Among the IXo, bands can move rather freely within 
the nexus territory, which contains two to six other bands, 
while internexus movement is more restricted. Nonetheless, 
interaction occurs when bands of different nexus meet for 
ceremonial occasions and for exchange and in extremely hard 
times, when members of one nexus may be permitted to use 
land of another (Heinz 1979). In addition, about 20-30% of 
all marriages take place between members of different nexus 
(Heinz 1979). Among the IKung, there is no clear-cut organi­
zational unit comparable to the nexus, but persons engage in 
long-term exchange partnerships (hxaro) (Wiessner 1977, 1981), 
which permit the utilization of the land of partners who may 
live up to 200 km away. This gives the average IKung access 
to the land of two to four other bands in the immediate area, 
as well as to that of two or three bands in more distant areas 
(Wiessner 1981), creating an interaction sphere similar in size 
to that of the IXo but differently organized in space. For 80 out 
of 86 visits, lasting between one week and ten months, recorded 
for 20 IKung over two years, only six were made to a band in 
which the person did not have appropriate exchange ties. Four 
of these six visits occurred in the context of wage labour 
(Wiessner 1981). The IKung would not conceive of asking 
permission to utilize areas in which they do not have appropriate 
ties any more than we would think of asking a stranger or an 
acquaintance for permission to use his house for a few weeks.
Thus both IXo and IKung have formal systems for specifying 
who has access to which resources. Persons not holding these 
rights who encroach on the land of others will be met with 
hostility (Heinz 1979, Marshall 1976, Wiessner 1977). Differ­
ences which occur between these systems can be largely 
attributed to the highly localized rich resources in the IKung 
area, which make widespread ties advantageous, in contrast to 
the less rich, more evenly distributed resources of the IXo 
area, in which local scarcity cannot be as easily absorbed by 
regional abundance. Given this situation, whether one San 
group can be said to be more territorial than another needs to 
be carefully reexamined with the extensive data available on 
the San. Certainly Cashdan’s hypothesis merits such an effort.
Reply
by E l i z a b e t h  C a s h d a n  
Pittsburgh, P a ., U.S.A. 8 x 82 
While most of the commentators have reacted favorably to my 
theoretical arguments (Bishop and Smith being the chief 
exceptions), there is more disagreement about the empirical 
Bushman data. Indeed, the commentators disagree among 
themselves over how to interpret this material. Because the 
primary contribution of this paper is theoretical rather than 
empirical, I will address the theoretical comments first.
Two commentators question my use of the word “terri­
toriality.” Smith argues that social boundary defense is func­
tionally different from perimeter defense and suggests that the 
word “territoriality” should be limited to the latter. For this 
reason, he prefers his more restricted definition of territoriality 
to mine. Ehrenreich, while supportive of the analysis, also 
objects to my lumping these different strategies under the 
heading of territoriality and feels that students of human 
adaptation would do better to avoid the word altogether.
I use a definition of territoriality that encompasses both 
perimeter defense and social boundary defense for two reasons. 
First, the long history of debate about Australian and Bushman 
spatial organization is framed around the word territoriality.
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The word is already entrenched in the literature of these 
social-boundary-defense societies, and I do not think that the 
debates will be resolved by simply calling it something else. 
Second, I feel that the word “territoriality” is appropriate 
because in important respects social boundary defense and 
perimeter defense are functional equivalents (they need not be 
functionally identical to be usefully described by the same 
word). The function of excluding outsiders from resources is 
not simply a side effect of social boundary defense, as Smith 
suggests. The Bushman system of land rights does permit 
reciprocal access, but if there were no need to lim it that access 
there would be no need for a system of land rights in the first 
place; individuals could simply wander at will over the land­
scape. Cultural norms concerning land rights are necessary 
only because there is often a “conflict of interest” ; while it 
may be advantageous for each individual to have access to as 
many places as possible, it may also be advantageous, especially 
under conditions of resource scarcity, to keep others out.
I believe, therefore, that there are good reasons for con­
tinuing to use the word territoriality. However, the arguments 
in this paper would not be affected if the word were not used, 
and if more confusion than clarity is generated by the term I 
am quite willing to do without it.
Smith argues that it would be difficult or impossible to 
falsify the arguments presented here; he asks, “if increased 
resource abundance and predictability lead to perimeter 
defense territoriality, while decreased abundance and pre­
dictability lead to social boundary defense territoriality, when 
do we predict the [nonterritorial] situation described by 
Steward (1938) for Great Basin Shoshone?” Perhaps a simple 
graph will clarify this. As figure 3 shows, territory size deter­
mines the type of territoriality, while competition for resources 
determines the degree of territorial exclusion. There are two 
variables being predicted here, and both are subject to refuta­
tion. For example, since the type of territoriality is a function of 
territory size, the model would obviously be refuted if the 
Bushmen, with their very large range sizes, exhibited perimeter 
defense. And while every population has the means to exclude 
outsiders, there should be little or no evidence of territorial 
exclusion with either type when competition for resources is 
minimal. This part of the model would be refuted, therefore, 
if the patterning in territorial exclusion exhibited by the four 
Bushman groups were the opposite of that described. Pre­
sumably this also explains the Great Basin case mentioned by 
Smith.
It should also be possible to test the bridging arguments that 
explain why social boundary defense works, although I have 
not attempted to do so in this paper. For example, do informa­
tion costs concerning the location of resources increase with 
territory size and resource unpredictability? Is large territory 
size associated with longer occupancy of a territory by out­
siders? These bridging arguments are important for the theory 
presented here, and tests of their validity should be both 
possible and of interest.
1 - 1  S ocial B o u n d a r y  P e r im et er
D e f e n s e  D e f e n s e
C o m petitio n
low No T e r r i t o r i a l i t y  N o T e r r i t o r i a l i t y
low A b u n d a n c e  o f  high
(large territory) R e s o u r c e s  (small territory)
Fig. 3. Effects of competition and territory size on territoriality. 
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Bishop points to an alleged inconsistency in the model, 
saying “at some point on this hypothetical continuum between 
a situation characterized by relative abundance and pre­
dictability and one where ranges are sufficiently small to permit 
perimeter defense, there should be no territoriality.” The 
problem here is that Bishop is collapsing territory size (which 
determines the type of territoriality) and competition (which 
determines the degree of territoriality) onto one dimension of 
resource abundance. While territory size is determined pri­
marily by resource abundance (the empirical support for this 
relationship is well documented), competition is determined 
by both resource abundance and population density. Although 
I pointed this out in my paper and considered it where I had 
the data, my treatment of population density was cursory, and 
the discussion of competition was to that extent inadequate. 
Although none of the commentators mentions this problem, I 
consider it to be the major weakness of the paper and the 
probable source of Bishop’s criticism. It is a weakness common 
to all the territoriality papers cited, and a solution is not 
suggested here. However, some comments may be of relevance.
How does one measure “competition” for resources? If a 
population favored with greater resource abundance is also 
denser, how do we weigh the two factors in determining the 
degree of competition? I noted that the IKung work only 
about half as long at subsistence tasks as the G/wi (Lee 1979: 
chap. 9; Tanaka 1980:76-77), and I used this in conjunction 
with the environmental data to argue that the IKung are 
under less competition for resources, their higher density not­
withstanding. This isn’t a bad bet, and it is the best indicator 
I can think of, but “work effort” data are clearly time-con­
suming to collect and are not readily available in the ethno­
graphic literature. Given all this, it may be helpful to formulate 
and test general arguments that would help us predict the 
degree of competition. For example, we might expect competi­
tion to be related to the magnitude of temporal variation in 
resource abundance; if populations are “regulated” to environ­
mental resources they are presumably regulated to the lean 
times, and consequently populations in varying environments 
would be below carrying capacity much of the time. We might 
therefore expect greater competition where resources do not 
fluctuate temporally. Competition should also be related to 
population structure (group size and aggregation), since the 
local density of aggregated populations could be high enough to 
cause competition even where regional population density is 
low. Greater attention to this issue by anthropologists con­
cerned with the effects of competition and “population pres­
sure” would be helpful.
Two commentators discuss nonsubsistence resources. Bishop’s 
remark that I do not “seem to consider the possibility that 
forms of territoriality can be based upon nonfood resources” 
is simply untrue. The empirical analysis explicitly considered 
water and food as two separate resources, since their abundance 
in the Kalahari can vary independently. The theoretical 
discussion did not specify the type of resource at all, but can 
be applied to both food and nonfood resources. Examples of 
the latter that come to mind include water, obsidian and other 
raw materials, fishing sites, and “locational” resources such as 
access to trade routes. The circumstances under which it would 
pay to control access to such resources, and the means em­
ployed to do so, can be explained by using the same cost- 
benefit arguments presented for resources in general. “Ritual” 
resources, mentioned by Bishop and Hamilton in their dis­
cussions of aboriginal Australia, are more problematic. If these 
ritual resources are tied in at some level with subsistence 
variables, as I expect they are, the theory may still be appli­
cable. If they are not, and this is certainly possible, then what 
looks like territoriality may have a very different functional 
significance from that considered here.
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Hamilton brings up the issue of individual vs. group benefit. 
After pointing out that “cost-benefit theory must have behind 
it the notion that certain ‘strategies’ are more advantageous 
than others,” she asks “but one must enquire: advantageous 
to whom?” The assumption underlying cost-benefit models in 
biology is that an “advantageous strategy” maximizes fitness 
at the individual level. As Smith and Harpending note, the 
theoretical arguments presented here are also based on the 
costs and benefits that accrue to individuals. I am not quite 
sure what Harpending means when he says that I pose my 
problem in terms of what groups do, unless he is referring to 
my comparison of territorial exclusion among the four Bush­
man “groups.” It is often useful to compare populations on 
such variables (Yellen and Harpending’s [1972] comparative 
study of nucleation in several foraging and cultivating societies 
is a good example) so long as one recognizes that what appears 
as “fluidity” or “nucleation” on the level of the group results 
from the manipulation of land rights and kin ties by indi­
viduals. We are not in disagreement on this issue.
I now turn to comments on the Bushman data. Guenther 
and Howell wonder why I did not use my own data on the 
//G ana in the ethnographic comparisons. It was my original 
intention to do so (this paper actually began as an “intro­
duction” to another paper on //G ana territoriality), but I 
chose not to for reasons of space. The only way to discuss 
four different populations and a body of theory in a single 
paper is to make summary statements and cite sources in 
which the ethnographic material is presented in greater detail. 
I could not do that with the //G ana, as the territoriality 
data have not yet been published, and I did not have the space 
to present new material here.
Howell also wonders why I use the term “Bushmen,” which 
she finds derogatory, rather than “San.” I do not have strong 
feelings about the matter, but since “San” is a derogatory 
word used by Khoikhoi (“Hottentot”) peoples I see no reason 
to prefer it. Given the choice of a derogatory English term and 
a derogatory Khoikhoi term, I chose the former in the interest 
of comprehension. There seems to be no consensus on termi­
nology among Kalahari researchers today, although in the 
interest of clarity I will be most happy to conform to any that 
develop.
Three commentators express disagreements with my inter­
pretation of the Bushman literature: Wiessner doubts that 
the IKo are more territorial than the IKung, Bishop seems to 
think that they are but argues that this is most likely a result 
of contact, and Terashima thinks that conclusions about G/wi 
territoriality are premature in view of the different interpreta­
tions given by Tanaka and Silberbauer. On the other hand, of 
the five “Bushman experts” who have commented on the 
paper only Wiessner expresses such reservations, and the 
discussions of Bushman territoriality in Barnard (1979) and 
Guenther (1981) are in accord with the views expressed here. 
Perhaps Hamilton’s comment contains the answer to these 
conflicting interpretations; I was fascinated and dismayed to 
learn that “the intricacies of [Australian Aboriginal] human- 
land relations are emerging in land-claim courts through 
Aboriginal testimony under cross-examination.” After nearly a 
century of ethnographic studies of aboriginal Australians, it 
appears that the best data have been obtained by putting 
informants on the stand and cross-examining them I The 
implications for field methodology are interesting. While I 
expect that both court testimony and ethnographic interviews 
are colored by peoples’ vested interests, one must wonder 
with Hamilton “how our concepts of territoriality would alter 
if ‘Bushmen’ and others were able to present their views in a 
similarly rigorous enquiry.” In lieu of this, however, we must 
use the ethnographic accounts at hand. I turn now to the 
ethnographic criticisms mentioned above.
Bishop finds my ethnographic discussion flawed because I 
do not consider historical variables. He says that “while clearly
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there is a relationship between resource densities and terri­
toriality among the IKo and other Bushman groups, we can’t 
be certain that it doesn’t reflect adaptations to nonforaging 
activities until more historical work is done.” No, we cannot 
be certain, but that is the way of science. As Bishop knows, 
hypotheses can only be disproved, and he does not disprove the 
resource-density hypothesis. It is true that my theoretical 
arguments do not consider historical variables; all models are 
simplifications of reality, and the one presented in this paper 
is no exception. Such simplification is necessary if we are to 
gain analytical insights and predictive power. In my theoretical 
arguments I considered the variables that I think explain most 
of the variation in hunter-gatherer territoriality; the Bushman 
data provide encouraging support for this choice.
Bishop seems to feel that the greater territoriality of the IKo 
is a response to “interference,” arguing that 11 recent forms may 
be accommodations to conditions generated by pastoralism, 
which has been practiced in the Kalahari for centuries” (my 
emphasis). However, he does not specify how and why such 
contact increases territoriality. It is not enough simply to 
allude vaguely to “parallels” with the postcontact Northern 
Algonkian family trapping territory (an odd parallel, since the 
IKo do not have family territories, nor are the other relevant 
phenomena the same). Any attempt to argue that IKo terri­
toriality results from contact, furthermore, must consider the 
fact that the Nharo are the most heavily influenced by contact 
of the four groups discussed (see comment by Guenther) yet 
are the least territorial. This suggests that historical factors 
cannot account for the variation that we see in territoriality 
among these four groups.
Wiessner also feels that I should have considered historical 
factors and contact with other groups, although she does not 
argue, as Bishop does, that such contact is associated with 
greater territoriality. She suggests that the IKo’s hostility to 
strangers does not indicate territoriality, but rather results 
from “bad experiences with ranchers ensuing from a past 
incident of cattle theft.” This is unlikely, because the IKo have 
a reputation for hostility not only to these ranchers, but to 
other groups—including other Bushmen (see Heinz 1972 for 
examples). It is difficult to see how unfriendliness to other 
Bushmen (including, on occasion, other IKo) could result from 
the theft of a rancher’s cow. Similarly, the anthropological 
descriptions of IKung openness are based on the behavior of 
the IKung to each other, not just to Herero or Europeans. 
Perhaps the generosity of the Herero is a response to the more 
open behavior of the IKung themselves.
Wiessner also argues that because the IKo have access to as 
many bands as the IKung (four to seven for the IKung, two to 
six for the IKo) one cannot say that they are more territorial. 
However, the nexus is the territorial unit among the IKo, and 
access to bands within this territorial unit is therefore not an 
appropriate measure of territoriality. As noted, the !Ko rarely 
visit outside their nexus boundaries, whereas the IKung have a 
reticulate network of ties over the region. I agree in part with 
Wiessner’s remarks about the two environments. However, 
because of the considerable spatial variation in rainfall in the 
IKo region, which means that one area can be well-favored 
while another area is suffering severe drought, a widespread 
network of ties over the region might well be advantageous 
were it not for the overall scarcity of resources. This creates the 
situation “in which local scarcity cannot be as easily absorbed 
by regional abundance” and gives rise to the variation in 
territoriality observed here.
Terashima notes that Tanaka presents a rather different 
picture of G/wi territorial organization, one that more closely 
approximates that of the IKung. Like Terashima, I am puzzled 
by the discrepancy. As I indicated in my paper, however, I 
based my discussion on Silberbauer’s account because he gives 
quantitative data and an extended discussion of this topic, 
while Tanaka gives only a few sweeping generalizations about
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territoriality, amounting in all to only a few sentences. On 
other matters (density, work effort) Tanaka provides excellent 
data, and I was glad to be able to use them.
These disagreements over how to interpret the Bushman 
literature point not only to inadequacies in the data, but to a 
lack of precision in the operational measures of territoriality. 
Finding precise measures that can be applied to literature 
sources is a thorny problem, but the empirical disagreements 
will not be resolved unless progress is made in this direction. 
The suggestions in Barnard’s comment are helpful in this 
regard, and the comments of my critics are a useful indication 
of the complexities involved. I thank them, and all the com­
mentators, for their thoughtful and interesting remarks.
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